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Quantum channels enable the implementation of communication tasks inaccessible to their clas-
sical counterparts. The most famous example is the distribution of secret keys. However, in the
absence of quantum repeaters, the rate at which these tasks can be performed is dictated by the
losses in the quantum channel. In practice, channel losses have limited the reach of quantum pro-
tocols to short distances. Quantum repeaters have the potential to significantly increase the rates
and reach beyond the limits of direct transmission. However, no experimental implementation has
overcome the direct transmission threshold. Here, we propose three quantum repeater schemes and
assess their ability to generate secret key when implemented on a setup using nitrogen-vacancy (NV)
centers in diamond with near-term experimental parameters. We find that one of these schemes -
the so-called single-photon scheme, requiring no quantum storage - has the ability to surpass the
capacity - the highest secret-key rate achievable with direct transmission - by a factor of 7 for a
distance of approximately 9.2 km with near-term parameters, establishing it as a prime candidate
for the first experimental realization of a quantum repeater.
I. INTRODUCTION
There exist communication tasks for which quantum
resources allow for qualitative advantages. Examples
of such tasks include clock synchronization [1–4], dis-
tributed computation [5], anonymous information trans-
mission [6, 7], and the distribution of secret keys [8, 9].
While some of these tasks have been implemented over
short distances, their implementation over long distances
remains a formidable challenge.
One of the main hurdles for long-distance quantum
communication is the loss of photons, whether it is
through fiber or free-space. Unfortunately, the no-
cloning theorem [10] makes the amplification of the trans-
mitted quantum states impossible. For tasks such as the
generation of shared secret key or entanglement, this lim-
its the corresponding generation rate to scale at best lin-
early in the transmissivity η of the fiber joining two dis-
tant parties [11–13].
Luckily, while quantum mechanics prevents us from
overcoming the effects of losses through amplification, it
is possible to do so using repeater stations [14–16]. For-
mally, we call a quantum repeater a device that allows
for a better performance than can be achieved over the
direct communication channel alone [17]. This perfor-
mance is measured differently for different tasks, such
as secret-key generation or transmission of quantum in-
formation. Consequently, the optimal performance that
can be achieved over the direct channel without using
repeaters, called the channel capacity, is also different
for these two tasks. Here we will assess our proposed re-
peater schemes for the task of secret-key generation, as it
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is easier to realize experimentally. Our formal definition
of a repeater—as opposed to a relative definition with re-
spect to some setup of reference—endows the demonstra-
tion of a quantum repeater with a fundamental meaning
that cannot be affected by future technological develop-
ments in the field.
However, a successful experimental implementation of
a quantum repeater has not yet been demonstrated. This
is mainly due to the additional noise introduced by such a
quantum repeater. While the implementation of a single
quantum repeater does not necessarily imply that that
setup can be scaled up to a larger number of repeater
nodes (due to the effects of noise and decoherence), the
first demonstration of a functioning quantum repeater
will form an important step toward practical quantum
communication and the quantum internet [18].
A multitude of quantum repeater schemes have been
put forward [15, 19–29], each with their own strengths
and weaknesses. It should be noted here that most of the
earlier repeater proposals aim at overcoming transmis-
sion losses using heralded entanglement generation and
compensate for noise arising in quantum memories us-
ing two-way entanglement distillation. However, some of
the schemes, e.g. , those in Refs. [24–26] introduce error
correction to overcome operational errors while those in
Refs. [27–29] use error correction also for dealing with
losses. Although a priori it is not clear which of those
schemes will perform best with current or near-term ex-
perimental parameters, it is clear that operating on large
number of qubits in each repeater node, necessary for the
implementation of error correction, is a significant exper-
imental challenge. Therefore, it is not expected that the
first realizations of quantum repeaters will be based on
large error-correction schemes. Hence, here we will fo-
cus on simple schemes without encoding, leaving out also
entanglement distillation. We will discuss entanglement
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2distillation in the context of our findings in the discussion
at the end of the article.
In this work, we propose three such schemes and to-
gether with the fourth scheme analyzed before [17, 30],
we assess their performance for generating secret key.
We consider their implementation based on nitrogen-
vacancy centers in diamond (NV centers), a system which
has properties making it an excellent candidate for long-
distance quantum communication applications [31–40].
The four considered schemes are the following: the
“single sequential quantum repeater node” (first pro-
posed and studied in Ref. [30], then further analyzed in
Ref. [17]), the single-photon scheme (proposed originally
in the context of remote entanglement generation [41],
also studied in the context of secret-key generation with-
out quantum memories [42]), and two schemes which
are a combination of the first two. See Fig. 1 for a
schematic overview of the repeater proposals considered
in this work.
We compare the secret-key rate of each of these
schemes to the highest theoretically achievable secret-
key rate using direct transmission, the secret-key capac-
ity of the pure-loss channel [13]. We show that one of
these schemes, the single-photon scheme, can surpass the
secret-key capacity by a factor of 7 for a distance of ≈ 9.2
km with near-term parameters. This shows the viability
of this scheme for the first experimental implementation
of a quantum repeater.
In Sec. II, we discuss and detail the different re-
peater proposals that will be assessed in this work. In
Sec. III, we expand on how the different components of
the repeater proposals would be implemented experimen-
tally. Sec. IV details how to calculate the secret-key rate
achieved with the quantum repeater proposals from the
modeled components. In Sec. V we discuss how to assess
the performance of a quantum repeater. The compar-
ison of the different repeater proposals is performed in
Sec. VI, which allows us to conclude with our results in
Sec. VII. The numerical results of this article were pro-
duced with a PYTHON and a MATHEMATICA script, which
are available upon request.
II. QUANTUM REPEATER SCHEMES
In the following section, we present the quantum re-
peater schemes that will be assessed in this work. All
these schemes use NV-center-based setups which involve
memory nodes consisting of an electron spin qubit acting
as an optical interface and possibly an additional carbon
13C nuclear spin qubit acting as a long-lived quantum
memory. Specifically, the optical interface of the elec-
tron spin allows for the generation of spin-photon entan-
glement, where the photonic qubits can then be transmit-
ted over large distances. The carbon nuclear spin acts as
a long-lived memory, but can be accessed only through
the interaction with the electron spin. Here, we briefly
go over all the proposed schemes, consider why they are
FIG. 1. Schematic overview of the four quantum repeater
schemes assessed in this paper. From top to bottom: the Sin-
gle Sequential Quantum Repeater (SiSQuaRe) scheme (A),
the single-photon scheme (B), the Single-Photon with Addi-
tional Detection Setup (SPADS) scheme (C) and the Single-
Photon Over Two Links (SPOTL) scheme (D). The purple
particles represent NV electron spins capable of emitting pho-
tons (red wiggly arrows) while the yellow particles represent
carbon 13C nuclear spins. Dark blue squares depict the beam
splitters used to erase the which-way information of the pho-
tons, followed by blue photon detectors. For more details on
the different proposals, see Sec. II.
interesting from an experimental perspective, and discuss
their advantages and disadvantages.
A. The Single Sequential Quantum Repeater
(SiSQuaRe) scheme
The first scheme that we discuss here was proposed
and analyzed in Ref. [30] and further studied in Ref. [17].
The scheme involves a node holding two quantum mem-
ories in the middle of Alice and Bob (see Fig. 2). This
middle node tries to send a photonic qubit, encoded in
the time-bin degree of freedom, that is entangled with
one of the quantum memories, through a fiber to Alice.
This is attempted repeatedly until the photon success-
fully arrives, after which Alice performs a BB84 [8] or
a six-state measurement [43, 44]. By performing such a
measurement, the quantum memory will be steered into
a specific state depending on the measurement outcome.
Now the same is attempted on Bob’s side. After Bob has
3FIG. 2. Schematic overview of the SiSQuaRe scheme. The
NV center in the middle first attempts to generate an entan-
gled photon-electron pair, after which it tries to send the pho-
ton through the fiber to Alice. Alice then directly measures
the photon, using either a BB84 or a six-state measurement.
Then after the state of the electron spin is swapped to the car-
bon 13C nuclear spin, the same is attempted on Bob’s side.
After both Alice and Bob measured a photon, a Bell-state
measurement is performed on the two quantum states held
by the middle node. Alice and Bob can use their measure-
ment outcomes together with the outcome of the Bell-state
measurement to generate a single raw bit of key.
measured a photon, the middle node performs a Bell-
state measurement on both quantum memories. Using
the classical information of the outcome of the Bell-state
measurement, Alice and Bob can generate a single raw
bit. In our model, the middle node has only one pho-
tonic interface (corresponding to the NV electron spin),
and hence has to send the photon sequentially first to
Alice and then to Bob.
While trying to send a photon to Bob, the state stored
in the middle node will decohere. A possible way to com-
pensate for the effects of decoherence is to introduce a so-
called cut-off [17]. The cut-off is a limit on the number
of attempts we allow the middle node to try and send a
photon to Bob. If the cut-off is reached, the stored state
is discarded, and the middle node attempts again to send
a photon to Alice. Since the scheme starts from scratch,
we are effectively trading off the generation time versus
the quality of our state. By optimizing over the cut-off,
it is possible to considerably increase the distance over
which secret key can be generated [17].
Setup and scheme
We will now describe the exact procedure of this
scheme, when Alice and Bob use a nitrogen-vacancy cen-
ter in diamond as quantum memories and as a photon
source. The scheme that we study is the following:
(1) The quantum repeater attempts to generate an en-
tangled qubit-qubit state between a photon and
its electron spin, and sends the photon to Alice
through a fiber.
(2) The first step is repeated until a photon arrives
at Alice’s side, after which she performs a BB84
or a six-state measurement. The electron state is
swapped to the carbon spin.
(3) The quantum repeater attempts to do the same on
Bob’s side while the state in the carbon spin is kept
stored. This state will decohere during the next
steps.
(4) Repeat until a photon arrives at Bob’s side, who
will perform a BB84 or a six-state measurement. If
the number of attempts n reaches the cut-off n∗,
restart from step 1.
(5) The quantum repeater performs a Bell-state mea-
surement and communicates the result to Bob.
(6) All the previous steps are repeated until sufficient
data have been generated.
B. The single-photon scheme
Cabrillo et al. [41] devised a procedure that allows for
the heralded generation of entanglement between a sepa-
rated pair of matter qubits (their proposal discusses spe-
cific implementation with single atoms, but the scheme
can also be applied to other platforms such as NV centers
or quantum dots) using linear optics. For the atomic en-
semble platform this scheme also forms a building block
of the Duan, Lukin, Cirac, Zoller (DLCZ) quantum re-
peater scheme [20]. Here we will refer to this scheme as
a single-photon scheme as the entanglement generation
is heralded by a detection of only a single photon. This
requirement of successful transmission of only a single
photon from one node makes it possible for this scheme
to qualify as a quantum repeater (see below for more
details).
The basic setup of the single-photon scheme consists
of placing a beam splitter and two detectors between Al-
ice and Bob, with both parties simultaneously sending a
photonic quantum state toward the beam splitter. The
transmitted quantum state is entangled with a quantum
memory, and the state space of the photon is spanned by
the two states corresponding to the presence and absence
of a photon. Immediately after transmitting their pho-
tons through the fiber, both Alice and Bob measure their
quantum memories in a BB84 or six-state basis (see the
discussion of which quantum key distribution protocol is
optimal for each scheme in Sec. IVB and in Sec. VIA).
Note that this is equivalent to preparing a specific state
of the photonic qubit and therefore is closely linked to
the measurement device independent quantum key dis-
tribution (MDI QKD) [45] as discussed in Appendix I.
However, preparing specific states that involve the su-
perposition of the presence and absence of a photon on
its own is generally experimentally challenging. The NV
implementation allows us to achieve this task precisely by
preparing spin-photon entanglement and then measuring
the spin qubit. Afterwards, by conditioning on the click
of a single detector only, Alice and Bob can use the in-
formation of which detector clicked to generate a single
raw bit of key; see Appendix E and Ref. [41] for more
information.
4The main motivation of this scheme is that, informally,
we only need one photon to travel half the distance be-
tween the two parties to get an entangled state. This
thus effectively reduces the effects of losses, and in the
ideal scenario the secret-key rate would scale with the
square root of the total transmissivity η, as opposed to
linear scaling in η (which is the optimal scaling without
a quantum repeater [46]).
However, one problem that one faces when implement-
ing this scheme is that the fiber induces a phase shift
on the transmitted photons. This shift can change over
time, e.g. due to fluctuations in the temperature and vi-
brations of the fiber. The uncertainty of the phase shift
induces dephasing noise on the state, reducing the quality
of the state.
To overcome this problem, a two-photon scheme was
proposed by Barrett and Kok [47], which does not place
such high requirement on the optical stability of the
setup. Specifically, in the Barrett and Kok scheme the
problem of optical phase fluctuations is overcome by re-
quiring two consecutive clicks and performing additional
spin-flip operations on both of the remote memories.
The Barrett and Kok scheme has seen implementation
in many experiments [48–51]. However, the requirement
of two consecutive clicks implies that a setup using only
the Barrett and Kok scheme with two memory nodes will
never be able to satisfy the demands of a quantum re-
peater. Specifically, the probability of getting two con-
secutive clicks will not be higher than the transmissivity
of the fiber between the two parties and therefore will
not surpass the secret-key capacity.
In the single-photon scheme, on the other hand, the
dephasing caused by the unknown optical phase shift is
overcome by using active phase-stabilization of the fiber
to reduce the fluctuations in the induced phase. This
technique has been used in the experimental implemen-
tations of the single-photon scheme for remote entangle-
ment generation using quantum dots [52, 53], NV cen-
ters [31] and atomic ensembles [54]. For experimental de-
tails relating to NV implementation, we refer the reader
to Sec. III. This phase-stabilization technique effectively
reduces the uncertainty in the phase, allowing us to sig-
nificantly mitigate the resulting dephasing noise; see Ap-
pendix A for mathematical details.
In contrast to the Barrett and Kok scheme, the single-
photon scheme cannot produce a perfect maximally en-
tangled state, even in the case of perfect operations and
perfect phase-stabilization. This is because losses in the
channel result in a significant probability of having both
nodes emitting a photon which can also lead to a sin-
gle click in one of the detectors, yet the memories will be
projected onto a product state. As we discuss below, this
noise can be traded versus the probability of success of
the scheme by reducing the weight of the photon-presence
term in the generated spin-photon entangled state. This
is discussed in more detail below and the full analysis is
presented in Appendix E.
The single-photon scheme with phase-stabilization is a
FIG. 3. Schematic overview of the single-photon scheme. Al-
ice and Bob simultaneously transmit a photonic state from
their NV centers toward a balanced beam splitter in the cen-
ter. This photonic qubit, corresponding to the presence and
absence of a photon, is initially entangled with the NV elec-
tron spin. If only one of the detectors (which can be seen at
the top of the figure) registers a click, Alice and Bob can use
the information of which detector clicked to generate a single
raw bit of key.
promising candidate for a near-term quantum repeater
with NV centers. We note here that recently other QKD
schemes that use the MDI framework have been pro-
posed. These schemes, similar to our proposal, use single-
photon detection events to overcome the linear scaling of
the secret-key rate with η [42, 55, 56]. In these propos-
als, in contrast to our single-photon scheme, no quan-
tum memories are used, but instead Alice and Bob send
phase-randomized optical pulses to the middle heralding
station.
Setup and scheme
In the setup of the single-photon scheme, Alice and
Bob are separated by a fiber where in the center there is
a beam splitter with two detectors (see Fig. 3). They will
both create entanglement between a photonic qubit and
a stored spin and send the photonic qubit to the beam
splitter.
Alice and Bob thus perform the following,
(1) Alice and Bob both prepare a state |ψ〉 =
sin θ |↓〉 |0〉+ cos θ |↑〉 |1〉 where |↓〉(|↑〉) refers to the
dark (bright) state of the electron-spin qubit, |0〉
(|1〉) indicates the absence (presence) of a photon,
and θ is a tunable parameter.
(2) Alice and Bob attempt to both separately send the
photonic qubit to the beam splitter.
(3) Alice and Bob both perform a six-state measure-
ment on their memories.
(4) The previous steps are repeated until only one of
the detectors between the parties clicks.
(5) The information of which detector clicked gets sent
to Alice and Bob for classical correction.
(6) All the previous step are repeated until sufficient
data have been generated.
5The parameter θ can be chosen by preparing a non-
uniform superposition of the dark and bright state of the
electron spin |ψ〉 = sin θ |↓〉 + cos θ |↑〉 via coherent mi-
crowave pulses. This is done before applying the optical
pulse to the electron which entangles it with the presence
and absence of a photon. The parameter θ can then be
tuned in such a way as to maximize the secret-key rate.
In the next section, we will briefly expand on some of
the issues arising when losses and imperfect detectors are
present. We defer the full explanation and calculations
until Appendix E.
Realistic setup
In any realistic implementation of the single-photon
scheme, a large number of attempts is needed before a
photon detection event is observed. Furthermore, a sin-
gle detector registering a click does not necessarily mean
that the state of the memories is projected onto the max-
imally entangled state. This is due to multiple reasons,
such as losing photons in the fiber or in some other loss
process between the emission and detection, arrival of the
emitted photons outside of the detection time window
and the fact that dark counts generate clicks at the de-
tectors. Photon loss in the fiber effectively acts as ampli-
tude damping on the state of the photon when using the
state space spanned by the presence and absence of the
photon [13, 57]. Dark counts are clicks in the detectors,
caused by thermal excitations. These clicks introduce
noise, since it is impossible to distinguish between clicks
caused by thermal excitations and the photons traveling
through the fiber if they arrive in the same time window.
All these sources of loss and noise acting on the photonic
qubits are discussed in detail in Appendix A. Finally, we
note that we assume here the application of non-number-
resolving detectors. This can lead to additional noise in
the low-loss regime, since the event in which two pho-
tons got emitted cannot be distinguished from the single-
photon emission events even if no photons got lost. How-
ever, in any realistic loss regime this is not a problem,
since the probability of two such photons arriving at the
heralding station is quadratically suppressed with respect
to events where only one photon arrives. In the realis-
tic regime, almost all the noise coming from the impos-
sibility of distinguishing two-photon from single-photon
emission events is the result of photon loss. Namely, if a
two-photon emission event occurs and the detector reg-
isters a click, then with dominant probability it is due to
only a single photon arriving, while the other one being
lost. Hence the use of photon-number-resolving detec-
tors would not give any visible benefit with respect to
the use of the non-number-resolving ones. For a detailed
calculation of the effects of losses and dark counts for the
single-photon scheme, see Appendix E.
FIG. 4. Schematic overview of the SPADS scheme. First,
the two NV centers run the single-photon scheme, such that
Alice measures her electron spin directly after every attempt.
After success, the middle node swaps its state to the carbon
spin. Then the middle node generates electron-photon entan-
gled pairs where the photonic qubit is encoded in the time-bin
degree of freedom and sent to Bob. This is attempted until
Bob successfully measures the photon or until the cut-off is
reached. If the cut-off is reached, the scheme gets restarted,
otherwise the middle node performs an entanglement swap-
ping on its two memories and communicates the classical out-
come to Alice and Bob, who can correct their measurement
outcomes to obtain a bit of raw key.
C. Single-Photon with Additional Detection Setup
(SPADS) scheme
The third scheme that we consider here is the
Single-Photon with Additional Detection Setup (SPADS)
scheme, which is effectively a combination of the single-
photon scheme and the SiSQuaRe scheme as shown in
Fig. 4. If the middle node is positioned at two-thirds of
the total distance away from Alice, the rate of this setup
would scale, ideally, with the cube root of the transmis-
sivity η.
This scheme runs as follows:
(1) Alice and the repeater run the single-photon
scheme until success, however, only Alice performs
her spin measurement immediately after each spin-
photon entanglement generation attempt. This
measurement is either in a six-state or BB84 ba-
sis.
(2) The repeater swaps the state of the electron spin
onto the carbon spin.
(3) The repeater runs the second part of the SiSQuaRe
scheme with Bob. This means it generates spin-
photon entanglement between an electron and the
time-bin encoded photonic qubit. Afterwards, it
sends the photonic qubit to Bob. This is repeated
until Bob successfully measures his photon in a
six-state or BB84 basis or until the cut-off n∗ is
reached, in which case the scheme is restarted with
step 1.
(4) After Bob has received the photon and communi-
cated this to the repeater, the repeater performs a
Bell-state measurement on its two quantum mem-
ories and communicates the classical result to Bob.
(5) All the previous steps are repeated until sufficient
data have been generated.
6The motivation for introducing this scheme is twofold.
First, we note that by using this scheme we divide the to-
tal distance between Alice and Bob into three segments:
two segments corresponding to the single-photon sub-
scheme and the third segment over which the time-bin-
encoded photons are sent. This gives us one additional
independent segment with respect to the single-photon or
the SiSQuaRe scheme on their own. Hence, for distances
where no cut-off is required, we expect the scaling of the
secret-key rate with the transmissivity to be better than
the ideal square root scaling of the previous two schemes.
Furthermore, dividing the total distance into more seg-
ments should also allow us to reach larger distances be-
fore dark counts become significant. When considering
the resources necessary to run this scheme, we note that
the additional third node needs to be equipped only with
a photon detection setup.
Second, we note that the SPADS scheme can also be
naturally compared to the scenario in which an NV center
is used as a single-photon source for direct transmission
between Alice and Bob. Both the setup for the SPADS
scheme and such direct transmission involve Alice using
an NV for emission and Bob having only a detector setup.
Hence, the SPADS scheme corresponds to inserting a new
NV node (the repeater) between Alice and Bob without
changing their local experimental setups at all. This mo-
tivates us to compare the achievable secret-key rate of
the SPADS scheme and direct transmission. We perform
this comparison on a separate plot in Sec. VI.
D. Single-Photon Over Two Links (SPOTL)
scheme
The final scheme that we study here is the Single-
Photon Over Two Links (SPOTL) scheme, and it is an-
other combination of the single-photon and SiSQuaRe
schemes. A node is placed between Alice and Bob which
tries to sequentially generate entanglement with their
quantum memories by using the single-photon scheme
(see Fig. 5). The motivation for this scheme is that, while
using relatively simple components and without impos-
ing stricter requirements on the memories than in the
previous schemes, its secret-key rate would ideally scale
with the fourth root of the transmissivity η.
Setup and scheme
The setup that we study is the following:
(1) Alice and the repeater run the single-photon
scheme until success with the tunable parameter
θ = θA. However, only Alice performs her spin
measurement immediately after each spin-photon
entanglement generation attempt. This measure-
ment is in a six-state basis.
FIG. 5. Schematic overview of the setup for the SPOTL
scheme. This scheme is a combination of the SiSQuaRe and
single-photon scheme. Instead of sending photons directly
through the fiber as in the SiSQuaRe scheme, entanglement
is established between the middle node and Alice and Bob
using the single-photon scheme.
(2) The repeater swaps the state of the electron spin
onto the carbon spin.
(3) Bob and the repeater run the single-photon scheme
until success or until the cut-off n∗ is reached, in
which case the scheme is restarted with step 1. The
tunable parameter is set here to θ = θB . Again,
only Bob performs his spin measurement immedi-
ately after each spin-photon entanglement genera-
tion attempt and this measurement is in a six-state
basis.
(4) The quantum repeater performs a Bell-state mea-
surement and communicates the result to Bob.
(5) All the previous steps are repeated until sufficient
data have been generated.
We note that for larger distances the optimal cut-off be-
comes smaller. Then, since we lose the independence of
the attempts on both sides, the scaling of the secret-key
rate with distance is expected to drop to √η, which is the
same as for the single-photon scheme. However, the total
distance between Alice and Bob is now split into four seg-
ments. Alice and Bob thus send photons over only one
fourth of the total distance. Thus, this scheme should
be able to generate key over much larger distances than
the previous ones, as the dark counts will start becoming
significant for larger distances only.
III. NV-IMPLEMENTATION
Having proposed different quantum repeater schemes,
we now move on to describe their experimental im-
plementation based on nitrogen-vacancy centers in dia-
mond [58]. This defect center is a prime candidate for a
repeater node due to its packaged combination of a bright
optical interface featuring spin-conserving optical tran-
sitions that enable high-fidelity single-shot readout [59]
and individually addressable, weakly coupled 13C mem-
ory qubits that can be used to store quantum states in a
robust fashion [33, 60]. Moreover, second-long coherence
times of an NV electron spin have been achieved recently
by means of dynamical decoupling sequences [32].
7By applying selective optical pulses and coherent mi-
crowave rotations, we first generate spin-photon entan-
glement at an NV center node [50]. To generate entan-
glement between two distant NV electron spins, these
emitted photons are then overlapped on a central beam
splitter to remove their which-path information. Subse-
quent detection of a single photon heralds the generation
of a spin-spin entangled state [50]. For all schemes based
on single-photon entanglement generation, we need to
employ active phase-stabilization techniques to compen-
sate for phase shifts of the transmitted photons, which
will reduce the entangled state fidelity, as introduced in
Sec. II B. These fluctuations arise from both mechani-
cal vibrations and temperature-induced changes in op-
tical path length, as well as phase fluctuations of the
lasers used during spin-photon entanglement generation.
This problem can be mitigated by using light reflected off
the diamond surface to probe the phase of an effectively
formed interferometer between the two NV nodes and the
central beam splitter, and by feeding the acquired error
signal back to a fiber stretcher that changes the relative
optical path length [31].
The electron spin state can be swapped to a surround-
ing 13C nuclear spin to free up the single optical NV inter-
face per node for a subsequent entangling round; a weak
(approx. few kHz), always-on, distance-dependent mag-
netic hyperfine interaction between the electron and 13C
spin forms the basis of a dynamical decoupling based uni-
versal set of nuclear gates that allow for high-fidelity con-
trol of individual nuclear spins [33, 34, 37, 38]. Crucially,
the so-formed memory can retain coherence for thou-
sands of remote entangling attempts despite stochastic
electron spin reset operations, quasi static noise, and mi-
crowave control infidelities during the subsequent prob-
abilistic entanglement generation attempts [38, 61] (see
Appendix B for details).
In the NV node containing both the electron and car-
bon nuclear spin, it is also possible to perform a de-
terministic Bell-state measurement on the two spins.
Specifically, a combination of two nuclear-electron spin
gates and two sequential electron spin state measure-
ments reads out the combined nuclear-electron spin state
in the Z and X bases, enabling us to discriminate all four
Bell states [62].
For an NV center in free space, only ∼ 3% of photons
are emitted in the zero-phonon line (ZPL) that can be
used for secret-key generation. This poses a key chal-
lenge for a repeater implementation, since this means
that the probability of successfully detecting an emit-
ted photon is low. Therefore, we consider a setup in
which the NV center is embedded in an optical cavity
with a high ratio of quality factor Q to mode volume
V to enhance this probability via the Purcell effect in
the weak coupling regime [63]. This directly translates
into a lower optical excited state lifetime that is bene-
ficial to shorten the time window during which we de-
tect ZPL photons after the beam splitter, reducing the
impact of dark counts on the entangled state. Addition-
ally, a cavity introduces a preferential mode into which
the ZPL photons are emitted that can be picked up ef-
ficiently. This leads to a higher expected collection ef-
ficiency than the non cavity case [40]. Enhancement of
the ZPL has been successfully implemented for differ-
ent cavity architectures, including photonic crystal cavi-
ties [64–71], microring resonators [72], whispering gallery
mode resonators [73, 74] and open, tunable cavities [75–
77]. However, cavity-assisted entanglement generation
has not yet been demonstrated for these systems, limited
predominantly by broad optical lines of surface-proximal
NV centers. Therefore, we focus on the open, tunable
microcavity approach [78], since it has the potential for
incorporating micron-scale diamond slabs inside the cav-
ity, while allowing to keep high Q/V values and provid-
ing in situ spatial and spectral tunability [79]. In these
diamond slabs, an NV center can be microns away from
surfaces, potentially allowing to maintain bulklike optical
and spin properties as needed for the considered repeater
protocols.
IV. CALCULATION OF THE SECRET-KEY
RATE
With the modeling of each of the components of the
different setups in hand, the performance of each setup
can be estimated. The performance of a setup is as-
sessed in this paper by its ability to generate secret key
between two parties, Alice and Bob. We note here that
the ability of a quantum repeater to generate secret key
can be measured in two different ways - in its through-
put and its secret-key rate. The throughput is equal to
the amount of secret key generated per unit time, while
the secret-key rate equals the amount of secret key gen-
erated per channel use. In this paper, we will focus on
the secret-key rate only. This is because it allows us to
make concrete information-theoretical statements about
our ability to generate secret key. Moreover, we note that
the secret-key rate is also more universal in the sense that
it can be easily converted into the throughput by multi-
plying it with the repetition rate of our scheme (number
of attempts we can perform in a unit time). It must
be also noted here that demonstrating repeater schemes
that achieve higher throughput than the currently avail-
able QKD systems based on direct transmission will be
a great challenge. This is because the sources of pho-
tonic states used within those QKD systems operate at
the GHz repetition rates, while the performance of the re-
peater schemes will be limited by many additional factors
such as transmission latency and time of local operations
at the memory nodes. These issues are not captured by
the secret-key rate directly. Nevertheless, as mentioned
before, the universality of the secret-key rate allows for
the interconversion between the two quantities. We fur-
ther discuss the differences between the throughput and
secret-key rate in Sec. VIE.
The secret-key rate R is equal to
8R =
Y r
Nmodes
, (1)
where Y and r are the yield and secret-key fraction, re-
spectively. The yield Y is defined as the average number
of raw bits generated per channel use and the secret-key
fraction r is defined as the amount of secret key that
can be extracted from a single raw bit (in the limit of
asymptotically many rounds). Here Nmodes is the num-
ber of optical modes needed to run the scheme. Time-
bin encoding requires two modes while the single-photon
scheme uses only one mode. Hence, Nmodes = 2 for all
the schemes that use time-bin encoding in at least one
of the arms of the setup. For the schemes that use only
the single-photon subschemes as their building blocks, we
have that Nmodes = 1.
In the remainder of this section, we will briefly detail
how to calculate the yield and secret-key fraction, from
which we can estimate the secret-key rate of each scheme.
A. Yield
The yield depends not only on the used scheme but also
on the losses in the system. We model the general emis-
sion and transmission of photons through fibers from NV
centers in diamond as in Fig. 6. That is, with probability
pce spin-photon entanglement is generated and the pho-
ton is coupled into a fiber. The photons that successfully
got coupled into the fiber might not be useful for quan-
tum information processing since they are not coherent.
Thus, we filter out those photons that are not emitted at
the zero-phonon line, reducing the number of photons by
a further factor of pzpl. Then, over the length of the fiber,
a photon gets lost with probability 1 − ηf = 1 − e−
L
L0 ,
where L0 is the attenuation length and ηf is the transmis-
sivity. After exiting the fiber, the photon gets registered
as a click by the detector with probability pdet. Finally,
the photon gets accepted as a successful click if the click
happens within the time window tw of the detector (see
Appendix A for more details).
The yield can then be calculated as the reciprocal of
the expected number of channel uses needed to get one
single raw bit,
Y =
1
E[N ]
, (2)
with N being the random variable that models the
number of channel uses needed for generating a single
raw bit.
Yield of the single-photon scheme
The yield of the single-photon scheme is relatively easy
to calculate, since the single condition heralding the suc-
Collection efficiency
pce Emission into ZPL
pzpl
Fiber transmissivity
ηf Detector efficiency
pdet
1
FIG. 6. The model of photon-loss proccesses occurring in our
repeater setups. The parameter pce is the photon-collection
efficiency, which includes the probability that the photon is
successfully coupled into the fiber. Only photons emitted at
the zero-phonon line (ZPL) can be used for quantum informa-
tion processing. All non-ZPL photons are filtered out, such
that a fraction pzpl of the photons remains. The photons
are then transmitted through a fiber with transmissivity ηf .
Such successful transmissions are registered by the detector
with probability pdet. Additionally, a significant fraction of
photons can arrive in the detector outside of the detection
time window tw. Such photons will effectively also get dis-
carded. Here we describe the total efficiency of our apparatus
by a single parameter, papp = pcepzplpdet.
cess of the scheme is a single click in one of the detectors
in the heralding station. Therefore, the yield Y is simply
the probability that an individual attempt will result in
a single click in one of the detectors. This probability
will depend on the losses in the system, dark counts and
the angle θ. A full calculation of the yield is given in
Appendix E.
Yield of the SiSQuaRe, SPADS, and SPOTL schemes
The SiSQuaRe, SPADS, and SPOTL schemes require
two conditions for the heralding of the successful gener-
ation of a raw bit, namely the scheme needs to succeed
both on Alice’s and Bob’s side independently. In this
case we are going to take a very conservative perspective
and assume the total number of channel uses to be the
sum of the required channel uses on Alice’s and Bob’s
side of the memory repeater node,
E[N ] = E[NA +NB ] . (3)
Moreover, every time Bob reaches n∗ attempts, both par-
ties start the scheme over again. The cut-off increases
the average number of channel uses, thus decreasing the
yield. Denoting by pA and pB the probability that a sin-
gle attempt of the subscheme on Alice’s and Bob’s side
respectively succeeds, we find (see Appendix C for the
derivation)
E[NA +NB ] =
1
pA
(
1− (1− pB)n∗
) + 1
pB
. (4)
9B. Secret-key fraction
The secret-key fraction is the fraction of key that can
be extracted from a single raw state. It is a function of
the average quantum bit error rates in the X, Y , and
Zbasis [80, 81] (QBER), and depends on the protocol
(such as the BB84 [8] or six-state protocol [43, 44]) and
classical postprocessing used (such as the advantage dis-
tillation post-processing [81]) .
Here we consider the entanglement-based version of the
BB84 and six-state protocols. That is, Alice and Bob
both perform measurements on their local qubits which
share quantum correlations. We note that both the BB84
and the six-state protocol can in principle be run either
in a symmetric or asymmetric way. Symmetric means
that the probabilities of performing measurements in all
the used bases are the same, while for asymmetric pro-
tocols they can be different. We note in the asymptotic
regime, which is the regime that we consider here, it is
possible to set this probability bias to approach unity
and still maintain security [82]. Unfortunately, for tech-
nical reasons, within our model it is not possible to run
an asymmetric six-state protocol when time-bin-encoded
photons are used [17].
Moreover, as we mentioned above, it is also possible
to apply different types of classical postprocessing of the
raw key generated through the BB84 or the six-state pro-
tocol. In particular, here we consider two types of post
processing: the standard one-way error correction and a
more involved two-way error correction protocol called
advantage distillation, which can tolerate much more er-
rors. Specifically, here we consider the advantage distil-
lation protocol proposed in Ref. [81], as this advantage
distillation protocol has high efficiency (in particular, in
the scenario of no noise, the efficiency of this protocol
equals unity). Hence, in our model we effectively con-
sider two protocols for generating secret key: BB84 with
standard one-way error correction and six-state with ad-
vantage distillation. We refer the reader to Appendix G
for the mathematical expressions for the secret-key frac-
tion for all the considered protocols.
Now we can state explicitly which QKD protocols will
be considered for each scheme, which in turn depends on
the type of measurements that Alice and Bob perform
in that scheme. There are two physical implementations
of measurements that Alice and Bob perform, depend-
ing on the scheme under consideration. That is, they
either measure a quantum state of a spin or of a time-bin
encoded photons. Since the fully asymmetric six-state
protocol with advantage distillation has higher efficiency
than both symmetric and asymmetric BB84 protocol
with one-way error correction, we will use this six-state
protocol for both the single-photon and SPOTL scheme.
The SiSQuaRe and SPADS schemes involve direct mea-
surement on time-bin encoded photons. Hence, for these
schemes, we consider the maximum of the amount of key
that can be obtained using the fully asymmetric BB84
protocol and the symmetric six-state protocol with ad-
vantage distillation (which can tolerate more noise, but
has three times lower efficiency than the fully asymmetric
BB84 protocol).
To estimate the QBER, we model all the noisy and
lossy processes that take place during the protocol run.
From this, we calculate the qubit error rates and yield,
from which we can retrieve the secret-key fraction. We
invite the interested reader to read about the details of
these calculations in Appendices E and F. The derivation
of the QBER and the yield for the SiSQuaRe scheme is
performed in Ref. [17]. Moreover, in this work we intro-
duce certain refinements to the model which we discuss
in Appendix D. With the QBER in hand, we can calcu-
late the resulting secret-key fraction for the considered
protocols as presented in Appendix G.
We note here that we consider only the secret-key rate
in the asymptotic limit, and that we thus do not have to
deal with non-asymptotic statistics.
V. ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF
QUANTUM REPEATER SCHEMES
In this section, we will detail four benchmarks that will
be used to assess the performance of quantum repeaters.
The usage of such benchmarks for repeater assessment
has been done in Refs. [17, 30], and achieving a rate
greater than such benchmarks can be seen as milestones
toward the construction of a quantum repeater.
The considered benchmarks are defined with respect
to the efficiencies of processes involving photon loss
when emitting photons at NV centers, transmitting them
through an optical fiber and detecting them at the end
of the fiber as described in Sec. IVA and as shown in
Fig. 6.
Having this picture in mind, we can now proceed to
present the considered benchmarks. The first three of
these benchmarks are inspired by fundamental limits on
the maximum achievable secret-key rate if Alice and Bob
are connected by quantum channels which model quan-
tum key distribution over optical fiber without the use of
a (possible) quantum repeater.
The first of these benchmarks we consider here is
also the most stringent one, the so-called capacity of the
pure-loss channel. The capacity of the pure-loss channel
is the maximum achievable secret-key rate over a channel
modeling a fiber of transmissivity ηf , and is given by [13]
− log2 (1− ηf ) . (5)
This is the maximum secret-key rate achievable, mean-
ing that even if Alice and Bob had perfect unbounded
quantum computers and memories, they could not gen-
erate secret key at a larger rate. If, by using a quan-
tum repeater setup, a higher rate can be achieved than
− log2(1−ηf ), we are certain our quantum repeater setup
allowed us to do something that would be impossible with
direct transmission. Surpassing the secret-key capacity
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has been widely used as a defining feature of a quantum
repeater [11–13, 17, 23, 30, 83–88]. Unfortunately, and
as could be expected, surpassing the capacity is experi-
mentally challenging. This motivates the introduction of
other, easier to surpass, benchmarks. These benchmarks
are still based on (upper bounds on) the secret-key ca-
pacity of quantum channels which model realistic imple-
mentations of quantum communications over fibers.
The second benchmark is built on the idea of in-
cluding the losses of the apparatus into the transmissivity
of the fiber. The resultant channel with all those losses
included we call here the extended channel. The bench-
mark is thus equal to
− log2 (1− ηfpapp) . (6)
Here papp describes all the intrinsic losses of the devices
used, that is, the collection efficiency pce at the emit-
ting diamond, the probability that the emitted photon is
within the zero-phonon line pzpl (which is necessary for
generating quantum correlations), and photon detection
efficiency pdet, so that papp = pcepzplpdet.
The third benchmark we consider is the so-called
thermal channel bound, which takes into account the ef-
fects of dark counts. The secret-key capacity of the ther-
mal channel has been studied extensively [13, 86–92]. We
consider the following bound on the secret-key capacity
of the thermal channel,
− log2
[
(1− ηfpapp) (ηfpapp)n
]
− g (n) , (7)
if n ≤ ηfpapp1−ηfpapp , and otherwise zero [13]. Here n is
the average number of thermal photons per channel use
and is equal to tw, the time window of the detector,
times the average number of dark counts per second; see
Ref. [17] for more details. The function g(x) is defined
as g(x) ≡ (x+ 1) log2 (x+ 1) − x log2 (x). We note here
that the time window of the detector tw is not fixed in our
model but is optimized over for every distance in order
to achieve the highest possible secret-key rate. Hence,
in this benchmark we fix tw = 5 ns which is the short-
est duration of the time window that we consider in our
secret-key rate optimization.
Finally, the secret-key rate achieved with direct trans-
mission using the same devices can be seen as the fourth
benchmark. Specifically, here we mean the secret-key
rate achieved when Alice uses her electron spin to gen-
erate spin-photon entanglement and sends the time-bin-
encoded photon to Bob. She then measures her electron
spin while Bob measures the arriving photon. However,
to take a conservative view, we will only use this direct
transmission benchmark for the SPADS scheme. This is
motivated by the fact that for both the SPADS scheme
and the direction transmission scheme, the experimental
setups on Alice’s and Bob’s side are the same, ensuring
that the two rates can be compared fairly. We note that
similarly as in the modeled secret-key rates achievable
with our proposed repeater schemes, also for this direct
transmission benchmark we optimize over the time win-
dow tw for each distance.
The secret-key capacity stated in Eq. (5) is the main
benchmark that we consider. Surpassing it establishes
the considered scheme as a quantum repeater. The two
expressions in Eqs. (6) and (7) and the achieved rate with
direct transmission are additional benchmarks, which
guide the way toward the implementation of a quantum
repeater. We define all the considered benchmarks for
the channel with the same fiber attenuation length L0 as
the channel used for the corresponding achievable secret-
key rate.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now have a full model of the rate of the presented
quantum repeater protocols as a function of the under-
lying experimental parameters. In this section, we will
first state all the parameters required by our model and
then present the results and conclusions drawn from the
numerical implementation of this model. In particular,
in Sec. VIA, we will first provide a deeper insight into
the benefits of using the six-state protocol and advan-
tage distillation in specific schemes. In Sec. VIB, we
determine the optimal positioning of the repeater nodes
for our schemes and investigate the dependence of the
secret-key rate achievable with those schemes on the pho-
ton emission angle θ and the cutoff n∗ for the appropriate
schemes. In Sec. VIC, we then use the insights acquired
in the previous section to compare the achievable secret-
key rates for all the proposed repeater schemes with the
secret-key capacity and other proposed benchmarks. In
particular, we show that the single-photon scheme signifi-
cantly outperforms the secret-key capacity and hence can
be used to demonstrate a quantum repeater. Finally, in
Sec. VID, we determine the duration of the experiment
that would allow us to demonstrate such a quantum re-
peater with the single-photon scheme.
The parameters that we will use are either parameters
that have been achieved in an experiment or correspond
to expected parameters when the NV center is embedded
in an optical Fabry-Perot microcavity. The parameters
we will use are listed in Table 1.
To be now more specific, the photon collection effi-
ciency pce and the probability of emitting into the zero-
phonon line pzpl are the two crucial parameters relying
on the implementation of the optical cavity. The quoted
value of pce has not been experimentally demonstrated
yet, while the value of pzpl has not been demonstrated
in the context of quantum communication. All the other
independent parameters in the above list that are not re-
lated to the setup with a cavity have been demonstrated
in experiments relevant for remote entanglement gener-
ation. The parameters that have not been discussed in
the main text are discussed in the appendixes.
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Parameter Notation Value
Dephasing of 13C due to interaction a0 1/2000 per attempt [38, 61]
Dephasing of 13C with time a1 1/3 per second [60]
Depolarizing of 13C due to interaction b0 1/5000 per attempt [38]
Depolarizing of 13C with time b1 1/3 per second [60]
Memory-photon entanglement preparation time tprep 6 µs [48]
Depolarizing parameter for the measurement of the electron spin Fm 0.95 [31]
Depolarizing parameter for two qubit gates in quantum memories Fg 0.98 [33]
Dephasing parameter for the memory-photon state preparation Fprep 0.99 [48]
Collection efficiency pce 0.49 [40, 48]
Emission into the zero-phonon line pzpl 0.46 [77]
Detector efficiency pdet 0.8 [48]
Dark count rate d 10 per second [48]
Characteristic time of the NV emission τ 6.48 ns [77, 93]
Detection window offset toffsetw 1.28 ns [48]
Attenuation length L0 0.542 km [48]
Refractive index of the fiber nri 1.44 [94]
Optical phase uncertainty of the spin-spin entangled state ∆φ 14.3◦ [31]
TABLE I. Parameters used for the nitrogen-vacancy center setups considered in this paper.
A. Comparing BB84 and six-state advantage
distillation protocols
We first investigate here when the BB84 or six-state
advantage distillation protocol performs better. It was
shown in Ref. [17] that in the SiSQuaRe scheme there is
a trade-off — for the low-noise regime (small distances)
the fully asymmetric BB84 protocol is preferable, while
in the high-noise regime (large distances) the problem of
noise can be overcome by using a six-state protocol sup-
plemented with advantage distillation. This technique al-
lows us to increase the secret-key fraction at the expense
of reducing the yield by a factor of three, since a six-state
protocol in which Alice and Bob perform measurements
on photonic qubits does not allow for the (fully) asym-
metric protocol within our model. Numerically, we find
that for the SPADS and SPOTL scheme advantage dis-
tillation is necessary to generate nonzero secret-key at
any distance. This is due to the fact that there is a
significant amount of noise in these schemes. Thus, for
the SPADS (SPOTL) scheme the (a)symmetric six-state
protocol with advantage distillation is optimal.
To provide more insight into the performance of those
different QKD schemes for different parameter regimes,
we plot the achievable secret-key fraction for the SPADS
and SPOTL schemes as a function of the depolarizing
parameter due to imperfect electron spin measurement
Fm in Fig. 7 (see Appendix B for the discussion of the
corresponding noise model). Noise due to imperfect mea-
surements is one of the significant noise sources in our
setup, since the SPADS scheme involves three and the
SPOTL scheme four single-qubit measurements on the
memory qubits. The data have been plotted for a fixed
distance of 12.5L0, where L0 = 0.542 km is the atten-
uation length of the fiber. Moreover, since on this plot
we aim at maximizing only the secret-key fraction over
the tunable parameters, we set the cutoff n∗ to one and
the detection time window tw to 5 ns (the smallest detec-
tion time window we use) for both schemes. Furthermore,
within the single-photon subscheme the heralding station
is always placed exactly in the middle between the two
memory nodes. We also consider the positioning of the
memory repeater node to be two-thirds away from Alice
for the SPADS scheme and in the middle for the SPOTL
scheme as discussed in the next section. For the SPOTL
scheme we also assume θA = θB , which we will justify in
the next section.
We see that for the current experimental value of
Fm = 0.95 both schemes can generate key only if the
advantage distillation postprocessing is used. As Fm in-
creases, we observe that for the SPADS scheme first the
six-state protocol without advantage distillation and then
the BB84 protocol start generating key. For the SPOTL
scheme the value of Fm at which the six-state protocol
without advantage distillation starts generating key is
much larger than the corresponding value of Fm for any
of the studied protocols for the SPADS scheme. This
is because the SPOTL scheme involves more noisy pro-
cesses than the SPADS scheme. This also provides an ap-
proximate quantification of the benefit of using advantage
distillation. Specifically, looking at the SPOTL scheme,
it can be observed that while at the current experimen-
tal value of Fm = 0.95, advantage distillation allows for
generating key, but at a higher value of the depolariz-
ing parameter Fm = 0.97, still no key can be generated
with standard one-way post-processing. Moreover, we
see that utilizing advantage distillation for the SPADS
scheme allows for the generation of key, even with very
noisy measurements when Fm = 0.91. We also observe
two distinct scalings of the secret-key fraction with Fm
in the regime where nonzero amount of key is generated.
These two scalings depend on whether we use a symmet-
ric or asymmetric protocol. Specifically, for the SPADS
scheme the symmetric six-state protocol is used. There-
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FIG. 7. Secret-key fraction as a function of the depolarizing
parameter due to noisy measurement Fm for the total distance
of 12.5L0. We see that for the current experimental value of
Fm = 0.95 (marked with a dashed black vertical line) both
schemes can generate key only if the advantage distillation
post-processing is used. As Fm increases, the protocols that
do not utilize advantage distillation also start generating key.
We also see that the curves can be divided into two groups in
terms of their slope in the regime where they generate nonzero
amount of key. Those two groups correspond to the scenar-
ios where a fully asymmetric (bigger slope) or a symmetric
(smaller slope) protocol is used. For all the plotted proto-
cols, the cutoff n∗ is set to one and tw = 5 ns (the smallest
detection time window we use) to maximize the secret-key
fraction. Moreover, for each value of Fm, we optimize the
secret-key fraction over the angle θ. For the SPOTL scheme
we assume θA = θB . For the SPADS scheme, we position the
repeater node 2/3 of the total distance away from Alice and
in the middle between Alice and Bob for the SPOTL scheme.
fore, the corresponding two curves have a slope that is
approximately three times smaller than the other three
curves corresponding to the protocols that run in the
fully asymmetric mode.
B. Optimal settings
We see that the above described repeater schemes in-
clude several tunable parameters. These parameters are
the cut-off n∗ for Bob’s number of attempts until restart,
the angle θ in the single-photon scheme, and the position-
ing of the repeater. These parameters can be optimized
to maximize the secret-key rate. Here we will approach
this optimization in a consistent way: We gradually re-
strict the parameter space by making specific observa-
tions based on numerical evidence.
The first claim that we will make is in relation to the
optimal positioning of the repeater. In Ref. [17], we have
conjectured that for the SiSQuaRe scheme the middle
positioning of the repeater is optimal. For the single-
photon scheme, we want the probability of transmitting
the photons from each of the two nodes to the beam-
splitter heralding station to be equal. This effectively
sets the target state between the electron spins to be the
maximally entangled state. Hence, if we restrict ourselves
to the case where the emission angles θ of both Alice
and Bob are the same, then it is natural to position the
heralding station symmetrically in the middle between
them. Hence, the only nonobvious optimal positioning is
for the SPADS and SPOTL scheme.
For the SPADS scheme, positioning the repeater at
two-thirds of the relative distance away from Alice could
intuitively be expected to be optimal. This is because
the single-photon scheme runs on two segments: Alice–
beam-splitter, beam-splitter–repeater, while the one half
of the SiSQuaRe scheme runs only over a single segment
between the repeater and Bob. By segment, we mean
here a distance over which we need to be able to inde-
pendently transmit a photon. In Fig. 8, we show the
secret-key rate as a function of the relative positioning
of the repeater for a set of different total distances. We
see there that despite the fact that positioning the re-
peater at two-thirds is not always optimal, it is a good
enough positioning for all distances for our purposes. For
each data point on the plot, we independently optimize
over the cut-off n∗, the angle θ of the single-photon sub-
scheme, and the duration of the detector time window
tw.
The SPOTL scheme has the same symmetry as the
SiSQuaRe scheme, in the sense that the part of the
scheme performed on Alice’s side is exactly the same as
on Bob’s side. This symmetry is only broken by the se-
quential nature of the scheme. Since we have already
observed that the middle positioning is optimal for the
SiSQuaRe scheme, we expect to see the same behavior
for the SPOTL scheme. Indeed, we confirm this expec-
tation numerically in Fig. 9. Here for each data point we
independently optimize over the cut-off n∗, the angle θA
(θB) of the single-photon subscheme on Alice’s (Bob’s)
side, and the duration of the detection time window.
To conclude, we will always place the heralding sta-
tion within the single-photon (sub)protocol exactly in the
middle between the two corresponding memory nodes.
Moreover, we will also always place the memory repeater
node in the middle for the SPOTL scheme and two-thirds
of the distance away from Alice for the SPADS scheme.
Having established the optimal positioning of the re-
peater, we look into the relation between θA and θB for
the SPOTL scheme. We observe that the relative error
resulting from optimizing the secret-key rate over a sin-
gle angle θA = θB rather than two independent ones is
smaller than 1% for all distances. Hence, from now on we
will restrict ourselves to optimizing only over one angle
θ for the SPOTL scheme.
Having resolved the issues of the optimal positioning of
the repeater for all schemes and reducing the number of
angles to optimize over for the SPOTL scheme to one, we
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FIG. 8. Secret-key rate as a function of the relative position-
ing of the repeater for few different total distances for the
SPADS scheme. The total distances are expressed in terms
of the fiber attenuation length L0 = 0.542 km. We see that
positioning the repeater two-thirds of the distance away from
Alice (marked by the vertical black dashed line) is a good
positioning for all the distances. For each total distance con-
sidered and each positioning, the secret-key rate is optimized
over the cutoff n∗, the angle θ, and the time window of the
detector tw.
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FIG. 9. Secret-key rate as a function of the relative position-
ing of the repeater for few different total distances for the
SPOTL scheme. The total distances are expressed in terms
of the fiber attenuation length L0 = 0.542 km. We see that
positioning the repeater in the middle between Alice and Bob
(marked by the vertical black dashed line) is a good position-
ing for all the distances. For each total distance considered
and each positioning the secret-key rate is optimized over the
cutoff n∗, the angles θA and θB and the time window of the
detector tw.
now investigate how our secret-key rate depends on the
remaining parameters. These parameters are the angle
θ, the cut-off n∗, and the duration of the detection time
window tw. The optimal time window follows a simple
behavior for all schemes: For short distances, the prob-
ability of getting a dark count pd is negligible compared
to the probability of detecting the signal photon. Hence,
for those distances we can use a time window of 30 ns
to make sure that almost all the emitted photons which
are not polluted by the photons from the optical excita-
tion pulse arrive inside the detection time window. We
always need to sacrifice the photons arriving within the
time toffsetw after the optical pulse has been applied to
filter out the photons from that pulse; see Appendix A
for details. Then, for larger distances where pd starts to
become comparable with the probability of detecting the
signal photon, the duration of the time window is grad-
ually reduced. This reduces the effect of dark counts at
the expense of having more photons arriving outside of
the time window. See Appendix A for the modeling of
the losses resulting from photons arriving outside of the
time window.
The dependence of the secret-key rate on the angle θ,
the tunable parameter that Alice and Bob choose in their
starting state |ψ〉 = sin θ |↓〉 |0〉+cos θ |↑〉 |1〉 in the single-
photon scheme, is more complex. We observe that the
optimal value of θ is closer to pi2 for schemes that involve
more noisy processes. Informally, this means that Alice
and Bob send ‘fewer’ photons toward the beam splitter
to overcome the noise coming from events in which both
nodes emit a photon. At pi2 however, no photons are
emitted and the rate drops down to zero. We illustrate
this in Figs. 10, 11, and 12. We see that for the SPADS
and SPOTL scheme, there is only a restricted regime of
the angle θ for which one can generate nonzero amount of
key. In particular, the SPOTL scheme requires a larger
number of noisy operations, and therefore cannot tolerate
much noise arising from the effect of photon loss in the
single-photon subscheme. This means that there is only
a small range of θ that allows for production of secret
key. The single-photon scheme involves fewer operations
and can tolerate more noise, and so lower values of the
parameter θ still allow for the generation of key.
We also investigate the dependence of the rate on the
cut-off. Both the SPADS and SPOTL scheme require
a lower cut-off than the SiSQuaRe scheme; see Figs. 13
and 14. This is caused by the fact that each of them
involves more noisy operations, and hence less noise tol-
erance is possible.
C. Achieved secret-key rates of the quantum
repeater proposals
Now we are ready to present the main results, the
secret-key rate for all the considered schemes as a func-
tion of the total distance when optimized over θ, the cut-
off n∗, and the duration of the time window tw. We
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FIG. 10. Secret-key rate as a function of the θ angle for the
single-photon scheme for the total distance of 12.5L0, where
L0 = 0.542 km. We see that there is a relatively large range of
angles for which nonzero amount of key can be generated. For
each value of θ, the secret-key rate is optimized over the time
window tw. The kink on the plot is a consequence of the fact
that the six-state protocol with advantage distillation involves
optimization over two subprotocols.
compare the rates to the benchmarks from Sec. V.
In Fig. 15, we plot the rate of all four of the quantum
repeater schemes as a function of the distance between
Alice and Bob. We observe that already for realistic near-
term parameters, the single-photon scheme can outper-
form the secret-key capacity of the pure-loss channel by
a factor of 7 for a distance of ≈ 9.2 km.
We have also investigated what improvements would
need to be done in order for the SPADS and SPOTL
schemes to also overcome the secret-key capacity. An ex-
ample scenario in which the SPADS scheme outperforms
this repeaterless bound includes better phase stabiliza-
tion such that ∆φ = 5◦ and reduction of the decoherence
effects in the carbon spin during subsequent entangle-
ment generation attempts such that a0 = 1/8000 and
b0 = 1/20000. Further improvement of these effective
coherence times to a0 = 1/20000 and b0 = 1/50000 al-
lows the SPOTL scheme to also overcome the secret-key
capacity. We note that maintaining coherence of the
carbon-spin memory qubit for such a large number of
subsequent remote entanglement-generation attempts is
expected to be possible using the method of decoherence-
protected subspaces [38, 61].
As mentioned before, the SPADS scheme can be natu-
rally compared against the benchmark of the direct trans-
mission using NV as a source. The results are depicted
in Fig. 16. We see that the SPADS scheme easily over-
comes the NV-based direct transmission and the thermal
benchmark for larger distances for which these bench-
marks drop to zero.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
Angle  (rad)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Se
cr
et
-k
ey
 ra
te
x10 7
SPADS
FIG. 11. Secret-key rate as a function of the θ angle for
the SPADS scheme for the total distance of 12.5L0, where
L0 = 0.542 km. We see that due to more noisy processes
the range of θ that allows us to generate key is much more
restricted than for the single-photon scheme. For each value
of θ, the secret-key rate is optimized over the cutoff n∗ and
the time window tw.
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FIG. 12. Secret-key rate as a function of the angle θ = θA =
θB for the SPOTL scheme for the total distance of 12.5L0,
where L0 = 0.542 km. We see that, due to the increased
amount of noisy processes, this scheme requires θ to be in a
much narrower regime than for the single-photon and SPADS
schemes, as can be seen by comparing the plot with the plots
in Figs. 10 and 11. This corresponds to the overwhelming
dominance of the dark state of the spin (no emission of the
photon) in order to avoid any extra noise coming from the
photon loss. For each value of θ, the secret-key rate is opti-
mized over the cutoff n∗ and the time window tw.
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FIG. 13. Secret-key rate as a function of the cut-off for the
SiSQuaRe and SPADS scheme for the total distance of 12.5L0,
where L0 = 0.542 km. We see that the SPADS scheme re-
quires a lower cut-off than the SiSQuaRe scheme because it
involves more noisy operations. For each value of the cutoff
n∗, we optimize the secret-key rate over the time window tw
and for the SPADS scheme also over the θ angle. The kink
for the SiSQuaRe scheme arises because of the optimization
over the fully asymmetric one-way BB84 protocol and sym-
metric six-state protocol with advantage distillation, which
itself involves optimization over two subprotocols.
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FIG. 14. Secret-key rate as a function of the cut-off for
the SPOTL scheme for the total distance of 12.5L0, where
L0 = 0.542 km. We see that due to the large number of noisy
operations, this scheme requires a low cut-off in order to be
able to generate key. For each value of the cutoff n∗ we op-
timize the secret-key rate over the time window tw and the θ
angle.
In Fig. 15, we observe that for the SPOTL scheme,
the total distance over which key can be generated is sig-
nificantly smaller than for the SPADS scheme. This is
despite the fact that the full distance is divided into four
segments. The rather weak performance of this scheme
is because it involves a larger number of noisy opera-
tions. As a result, the scheme can tolerate little noise
from the single-photon subscheme, requiring the angle
θ to be close to pi2 , as can be seen in Fig. 12. Hence,
the probability of photon emission becomes greatly di-
minished and so the distance after which dark counts
start becoming significant is much smaller than for the
SPADS scheme. To overcome this problem, one would
need to reduce the amount of noise in the system. One
of the main sources of noise is the imperfect single-qubit
measurement. Hence, we illustrate the achievable rates
for the scenario with the boosted measurement depolar-
izing parameter Fm = 0.98 in Fig. 17. Additionally, in
this plot we also consider the application of probabilistic
frequency conversion to the telecom wavelength at which
L0 = 22 km. Frequency conversion has already been
achieved experimentally in the single-photon regime with
success probability of 30% [95]. This is also the success
probability that we consider here. The corresponding
benchmarks have also been plotted for the new channel
with L0 = 22 km. We see in Fig. 17 that with the im-
proved measurement and using frequency conversion, the
SPOTL scheme allows now to generate secret key over
more than 550 km. We also see that under those con-
ditions the single-photon scheme can also overcome the
secret-key capacity of the telecom channel.
D. Runtime of the experiment
While the theoretical capability of an experimental
setup to surpass the secret-key capacity is a necessary re-
quirement to claim a working quantum repeater, it does
not necessarily mean that this can be experimentally ver-
ified in practice. Indeed, if a quantum repeater proposal
only surpasses the secret-key capacity by a narrow mar-
gin at a large distance, the running time of an experiment
could be too long for practical purposes. In this sec-
tion, we will discuss an experiment which can validate a
quantum repeater setup and calculate the running time
of such an experiment, where we demonstrate that the
single-photon scheme could be validated to be a quan-
tum repeater within 12 hours.
A straightforward way of validating a quantum re-
peater would consist of first generating secret-key, calcu-
lating the achieved (finite-size) secret-key rate and then
comparing the rate with the secret-key capacity. How-
ever, this requires a large number of raw bits to be gen-
erated, partially due to the loose bounds on finite-size
secret-key generation. What we propose here is an ex-
periment where the QBER and yield are separately esti-
mated to be within a certain confidence interval. Then,
if with the (worst-case) values of the yield and the QBER
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FIG. 15. Rate of all studied quantum repeater schemes as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob, expressed in the
units of L0 = 0.542 km. We also plot the different benchmarks from Sec. V. We see that the single-photon scheme outperforms
the secret-key capacity. For the achievable rates, the secret-key rate is optimized over the cutoff n∗, the angle θ, and the time
window tw independently for each distance.
the corresponding asymptotic secret-key rate still confi-
dently beats the benchmarks, one could claim that, in the
asymptotic regime, the setup would qualify as a quantum
repeater.
As we show in Appendix H, it is possible to run the
single-photon scheme over a distance of 17L0 ≈ 9.2 km
for approximately 12 hours to find with high confidence
(≥ 1 − 1.5 × 10−4) that the scheme beats the capacity
[see Eq. (5)] at that distance by a factor of at least 3.
E. Discussion and future outlook
It is worth noting that our figure of merit — the
secret-key rate — is weakly impacted by the latency of
transmission, which grows linearly with distance for the
SiSQuaRe, SPADS, and SPOTL schemes. Its only ef-
fect on the secret-key rate is the resulting decoherence
time in the quantum memories while the memory nodes
await the success or failure signals. This decoherence
due to the waiting time is negligible in comparison to the
noise due to interaction, arising from subsequent entan-
glement generation attempts. On the other hand, this
latency would clearly be very visible in low throughput
of these schemes. The single-photon scheme, on the other
hand, has an advantage of the repetition rate being lim-
ited only by the local processing of the memory nodes,
which would result in a higher throughput. We observe
this fact in the modest expected duration of the exper-
iment, even in the high-loss regime needed for overcom-
ing the secret-key capacity. It is worth noting that while
the single-photon scheme maintains constant latency for
QKD, there exist schemes where such constant latency
can be maintained also for remote entanglement genera-
tion; see e.g. Ref. [96]. It is hence clear that there are
certain important properties of an efficient quantum re-
peater scheme that are not captured by the secret-key
rate. However, achieving high throughputs for arbitrary
distances would require almost all the components to be
efficient in terms of rates and memories to be of high qual-
ity in terms of operational and long-storage fidelities. It
is clear that demonstrating all these features together in
a single experiment is still a future goal. The advantage
of the secret-key rate is that overcoming the secret-key
capacity would form a crucial step toward an implemen-
tation of an efficient and practical, long-distance quan-
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FIG. 16. Comparison of the SPADS scheme with the rate
achievable using the direct transmission, with NV being the
photon source. The secret-key rates for those schemes are
plotted as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob,
expressed in the units of L0 = 0.542 km. We also plot the
different benchmarks. We see that the SPADS scheme eas-
ily overcomes the direct transmission and the thermal bench-
mark (see Sec. V). For the secret-key rate achievable with
the SPADS scheme, we perform optimization over the cutoff
n∗, the angle θ, and the time window tw independently for
each distance. Similarly, we also optimize the secret-key rate
achievable with direct transmission over the time window tw.
tum repeater architecture whose validity would carry an
information-theoretic significance and will therefore be
totally independent of any hardware-based reference sce-
nario.
In our model, we have identified a significant amount
of noise arising in the system. As a result, we find that it
is not always beneficial to just divide the fixed distance
into more elementary links. Hence, it is a natural ques-
tion whether this noise could be eliminated e.g. using
entanglement distillation. In fact, for the noise arising
due to photon loss in the single-photon scheme, not only
does there exist an efficient distillation procedure [97, 98],
but it has also already been demonstrated in the NV
platform [33]. Moreover, in the ideal case of noiseless op-
erations and storage, a scheme based on generating two
entangled states through the single-photon scheme and
then distilling them as demonstrated in Ref. [33] should
effectively also be able to overcome the secret-key capac-
ity [35] and provide a significant boost by completely
removing the noise due to photon loss. Furthermore,
an implementation of such a distillation-based remote
entanglement generation scheme would alleviate the re-
quirement of the optical phase stabilisation of the sys-
tem. Therefore, this distillation-based scheme could be a
natural fifth candidate for a proof of principle repeater.
Nevertheless, we believe that the fidelities of quantum
operations and the effective coherence times of the mem-
ories used in this paper might need to be improved before
this distillation would prove useful.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed four experimentally relevant quantum re-
peater schemes on their ability to generate secret key.
More specifically, the schemes were assessed by contrast-
ing their achievable secret-key rate with the secret-key
capacity of the channel corresponding to direct trans-
mission. The secret-key rates have been estimated us-
ing near-term experimental parameters for the NV cen-
ter platform. The majority of these parameters have al-
ready been demonstrated across multiple experiments. A
remaining challenging element of our proposed schemes
is the implementation of optical cavities. These cavities
would enable the enhancement of both the photon emis-
sion probability into the zero-phonon line and the photon
collection efficiency to the desired level.
With these near-term experimental parameters, our as-
sessment shows the viability of one of the schemes, the
single-photon scheme, for the first experimental demon-
stration of a quantum repeater. In fact, the single-photon
scheme achieves a secret-key rate more than seven times
greater than the secret-key capacity. We also estimated
the duration of an experiment to conclude that a rate
larger than the secret-key capacity is achievable. The
duration of the experiment would be approximately 12
hours.
Finally, we show that a scheme based on concatenat-
ing the single-photon scheme twice (i.e., the SPOTL
scheme), has the capability to generate secret-key at
large distances. However, this requires converting the fre-
quency of the emitted photons to the telecom wavelength
and modestly improving the fidelity at which measure-
ments can be performed.
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FIG. 17. Secret-key rate as a function of distance in units of km for transmission at telecom channel with L0 = 22 km, along
with the benchmarks from Sec. V. We consider an improved measurement depolarizing parameter of Fm = 0.98. The frequency
conversion efficiency is assumed to be 0.3. We observe that the SPOTL scheme allows for the generation of secret-key over a
distance of more than 550 km. For the achievable rates, the secret-key rate is optimized over the cutoff n∗, the angle θ and the
time window tw independently for each distance.
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Appendix A: Losses and noise on the photonic qubits
In this appendix, we describe how the losses and noise affect our photonic qubits. In particular, we first recall how
the two types of encoding result in the losses acting as different quantum channels on the states. Then, we study
the effects of a finite detector time window. More specifically, we first show that the arrival of a photon outside the
time window is equivalent to all the other loss processes. Second, we calculate the probability of registering a dark
count within the time window. We also show how to model the noise arising from those dark counts for the SiSQuaRe
and SPADS schemes. Finally, we calculate the dephasing induced by the unknown phase shift for the single-photon
scheme.
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Effects of losses for the different encodings
The physical process of probabilistically losing photons corresponds to different quantum channels depending on
the qubit encoding. In our repeater schemes we use two types of encoding: time-bin and presence or absence of a
photon. For a time-bin encoded qubit in the ideal scenario of no loss we always expect to obtain a click in one of
the detectors. Hence, loss of a photon resulting in a no-click event raises an erasure flag which carries the failure
information. Therefore, it is clear that for this encoding the physical photon loss process corresponds to an erasure
channel with the erasure probability given by one minus the corresponding transmissivity,
D(ρ) = ηρ+ (1− η) |⊥〉〈⊥| . (A1)
Here |⊥〉 is the loss flag, corresponding to the nondetection of a photon. Since we are only interested in the quantum
state of the system for the successful events when a detection event has occurred, we effectively post-select on the
non-erasure events. For presence or absence encoding, the situation is different since now there is no flag available
that could explicitly tell us whether a photon got lost or not. In fact, for this encoding the photon loss results in
an amplitude-damping channel applied to the photonic qubit. Here, the damping parameter equals one minus the
transmissivity of the channel [99].
Effects of the detector time window
The detector only registers clicks that fall within a certain time window. It is a priori not clear what kind of noisy
or lossy channel should be used to model the loss of information due to nondetection of photons arriving outside
of the time window. This is because in a typical loss process we have a probabilistic leakage of information to the
environment. In the scenario considered here, the situation is slightly different as effectively no leakage occurs, but
rather certain part of the incoming signal effectively gets discarded. Here we will show that despite this qualitative
difference, within our model this process can effectively be modeled as any other loss process.
Now, let us provide a brief description of the physics of this process. First, the detection time window is chosen
such that the probability of detecting a photon from the optical excitation pulse used to entangle the electron spin
with the photonic qubit is negligible [48]. For that reason, the detection time window is opened after a fixed offset
toffsetw with respect to the beginning of the decay of the optical excited state of the electron spin. We note that for the
considered enhancement of the ZPL-emission using the optical cavity, we predict the characteristic time of the NV
emission τ to be approximately half of the corresponding value of τ if no cavity is used [48, 77, 93]. Therefore, here
we consider the scenario where the duration of the optical excitation pulse is made twice shorter with respect to the
one used in Ref. [48]. This will allow us to filter out the unwanted photons from the excitation pulse by setting toffsetw
to half of the offset used in Ref. [48].
Second, we note that the detection time window cannot last too long; specifically, it needs to be chosen such that
there is a good trade-off between detecting coherent and non-coherent (i.e., dark counts) photons. In this subsection,
we will discuss the effects of photons arriving outside of this time window and the effects of registering dark counts
within this time window.
a. Losses from the detector time window
The NV center emits a photon through an exponential decay process with characteristic time τ . Therefore the
probability of detecting a photon during a time window starting at toffsetw and lasting for tw is
pin(tw) =
1
τ
∫ toffsetw +tw
toffsetw
dt exp
(
− t
τ
)
= exp
(
− t
offset
w
τ
)
− exp
(
− t
offset
w + tw
τ
)
. (A2)
Clearly the process of a photon arriving outside of the time window is qualitatively different from the loss process
where the photons get lost to the environment. In the remainder of this section, we will now look at the difference
between these two phenomena in more detail.
The emission process of the NV center is a coherent process over time. Consider a generic scenario in which we
divide the emission time into two intervals, denoted by “in” and “out”, respectively. Coherent emission then means
that the state of the photon emitted by the electron spin in state |↑〉 will be
|ψ〉 = √pin |1〉in |0〉out +
√
1− pin |0〉in |1〉out . (A3)
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Now let us come back to our specific model, in which the “in” mode corresponds to the interval
[
toffsetw , t
offset
w + tw
]
and the “out” mode to all the times t ≥ 0 lying outside of this interval (t = 0 is the earliest possible emission time).
Here, the emission into the “in” mode occurs with probability pin(tw). Hence the spin-photon state resulting from the
emission by the α |↓〉+ β |↑〉 spin state is
|ψ〉 = α |↓〉 |0〉in |0〉out + β |↑〉
(√
pin(tw) |1〉in |0〉out +
√
1− pin(tw) |0〉in |1〉out
)
. (A4)
If the presence or absence encoding is used, such a photonic qubit is then transmitted to the detector. Since only the
spin and the “in” mode of the photon will be measured, we can now trace out the “out” mode:
ρ =
(
|α|2 + |β|2pin(tw)
)
|φ〉〈φ|+ |β|2(1− pin(tw)) |↑〉〈↑| ⊗ |0〉〈0|in , (A5)
where
|φ〉 = 1√
|α|2 + |β|2pin(tw)
(
α |↓〉 |0〉in + β
√
pin(tw) |↑〉 |1〉in
)
. (A6)
Note that this state can be obtained by passing the photonic qubit of the state
|ψ〉 = α |↓〉 |0〉+ β |↑〉 |1〉 (A7)
through the amplitude-damping channel with the damping parameter given by 1 − pin(tw). Hence we can conclude
that for the photon number encoding, the possibility of the photon arriving outside of the time window of the detector
can be modeled in the same way as any other photon loss process, namely an amplitude-damping channel applied to
that photonic qubit.
In the case of time-bin encoding we effectively have four photonic qubits, since now we have an “in” and “out” mode
for both the early (denoted by “e”) and the late (denoted by “l”) time window. We assume here that the slots do not
overlap. That is, a photon emitted in the “out” mode of the early time window is always distinct from any photon
in the late time window. This can be achieved by making the time gap between the “in” modes of the early and late
window long enough. In this case, the emission process results in a state
|ψ〉 = α |↓〉
(√
pin(tw) |1〉e,in |0〉e,out |0〉l,in |0〉l,out +
√
1− pin(tw) |0〉e,in |1〉e,out |0〉l,in |0〉l,out
)
(A8)
+ β |↑〉
(√
pin(tw) |0〉e,in |0〉e,out |1〉l,in |0〉l,out +
√
1− pin(tw) |0〉e,in |0〉e,out |0〉l,in |1〉l,out
)
. (A9)
Again, tracing out the “out” modes results in a state
ρ = pin(tw) |φ〉〈φ|+ (1− pin(tw))
(
|α|2 |↓〉〈↓|+ |β|2 |↑〉〈↑|
)
⊗ |00〉〈00|e,l , (A10)
where
|φ〉 = α |↓〉 |1〉e |0〉l + β |↑〉 |0〉e |1〉l = α |↓〉 |e〉+ β |↑〉 |l〉 . (A11)
Here |00〉e,l corresponds to the loss flag from which we see that for the time-bin encoding the possible arrival of a
photon outside of the time window results in an erasure channel with the erasure probability given by [1− pin(tw)].
Hence this process can be also modeled as any other loss process for this encoding.
We have just shown that for both photon presence or absence and time-bin encodings the process of the photon
arriving outside of the time window can be modeled by the source which prepares photons in a coherent superposition
of the “in” and “out” modes and the detector tracing out (losing) the “out” modes. We have also shown that those two
elements combined together result effectively in a loss process corresponding to the same channel as any other loss pro-
cess for that encoding (amplitude damping for photon presence or absence and erasure channel for time-bin encoding).
However, between the source and the detector, there are other lossy or noisy components resulting in other quantum
channels that need to be applied before the tracing out of the “out” mode at the detector. Now we show that for all
loss and noise processes that occur in our model, the tracing out of the “out” mode can be mathematically commuted
through all those additional noise and/or lossy processes. This means that the tracing out can be applied directly
after the source, such that the above described reductions to amplitude-damping or erasure channel can be applied.
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Consider the quantum channels acting on the photonic qubits of the form
N =
∑
i
piN iin ⊗N iout . (A12)
Effectively, these are the channels that do not couple the “in” and “out” modes. Since in reality “in” and “out” modes
correspond to different time modes, their coupling would require some kind of memory inside the channel. Hence we
can think of the above defined channels as channels without memory. Now it is clear that for a quantum state ρ that
among its registers includes both the “in” and the “out” mode, we have that
trout[N (ρ)] = trout
[∑
i
piN iin ⊗N iout(ρ)
]
=
∑
i
piN iin(ρin) . (A13)
Now, first tracing out the “out” modes and then applying the channel N (only the “in” part can be applied now) also
results in
∑
i piN iin(ρin) at the output. Hence, the tracing out of the “out” modes commutes with all the channels that
are of the form (A12), which correspond to channels without memory. Clearly, the noise and/or loss processes that
occur before the detection, such as photon loss or dephasing due to uncertainty in the optical phase of the photon,
belong to this class of channels. In particular, this means that for photon presence or absence the amplitude damping
due to photon loss in the channel and due to photon arrival outside of the time window can be both combined into
one channel with the single damping parameter given by 1 − ηpin(tw) (η denotes the transmissivity due to the loss
process, e.g., the transmissivity of the fiber). The same applies to time-bin encoding where we now have a single
erasure channel with erasure probability 1− ηpin(tw).
To conclude, the arrival of the photon outside of the time window can be modeled in the same way as any other loss
process for both photon encodings used and therefore we can now redefine the detector efficiency p′det = pdetpin(tw)
and the total apparatus efficiency p′app = pcepzplp′det. We can then define ηtotal = p
′
appηf as the total transmissivity,
with probability ηtotal a photon will be successfully transmitted from the sender to the receiver.
b. Dark counts within the detector time window
Photon detectors are imperfect, and due to thermal excitations, they will register clicks that do not correspond
to any incoming photons. These undesired clicks are called dark counts and can effectively be seen as a source of
noise. The magnitude of this noise depends on the ratio between the probability of detecting the signal photon and
measuring a dark count. Clearly, dark counts become a dominant source of noise when the probability of detecting
the signal photon becomes comparable to the probability of a dark count click. The probability pd of getting at least
one dark count within the time window tw of awaiting the signal photon is given by pd = 1− exp(−twd), where d is
the dark count rate of the detector [17].
In the SiSQuaRe scheme, Alice and Bob perform measurements on time-bin-encoded photons. The same applies
to Bob in the SPADS scheme. Since at least two detectors are required to perform this measurement, the presence
of dark counts means that the outcome may lie outside of the qubit space. Moreover, this measurement needs to be
trusted. In consequence, a squashing map needs to be used to process the multi-click events in a secure way. Here, as
an approximation, we consider the squashing map for the polarization encoding [100] in the same way as described in
Ref. [17]. Hence, this measurement can also be modeled as a perfect measurement preceded by a depolarizing channel
with parameter α, which depends on whether the BB84 or six-state protocol is used. The parameter α is given by [17]
αA/B, BB84 =
p′appηB(1− pd)
1− (1− p′appηA/B)(1− pd)2
, (A14)
αA/B, six-state =
p′appηA/B(1− pd)5
1− (1− p′appηA/B)(1− pd)6
. (A15)
Here ηA/B denotes the transmissivity of the fiber between the memory repeater node and Alice’s (Bob’s) detector
setup. Finally we note that dark counts increase the probability of registering a successful measurement event. For
the optical measurement schemes utilizing the squashing map, the probability of registering a click in at least one
detector is given by [17]
pA/B, BB84 = 1− (1− p′appηA/B)(1− pd)2 , (A16)
pA/B, six-state = 1− (1− p′appηA/B)(1− pd)6 . (A17)
The effect of dark counts in the single-photon scheme, which carries over to the SPOTL scheme, is analyzed in
Appendix E.
24
Noise due to optical phase uncertainty
Another important noise process affecting photonic qubits is related to the fact that for the photon presence
or absence encoding the spin-photon entangled state will also depend on the optical phase of the apparatus used.
Specifically, it will depend on the phase of the lasers used to generate the spin photon entanglement as well as the
optical phase acquired by the photons during the transmission of the photonic qubit. Knowledge about this phase is
crucial for being able to generate entanglement through the single-photon scheme. In any realistic setup, however,
there would be a certain degree of the lack of knowledge about this phase acquired by the photons. Since in the end
what matters is the knowledge about the relative phase between the two photons, we can model this source of noise as
the lack of knowledge of the phase on only one of the incoming photonic qubits. This noise process can be effectively
modeled as dephasing. In this section, we will show that the phase uncertainty induces dephasing with a parameter
λ equal to
λ =
I1
(
1
(∆φ)2
)
2I0
(
1
(∆φ)2
) + 1
2
, (A18)
where ∆φ is the uncertainty in the phase and I0 (I1) is the Bessel function of order 0 (1). Let us assume that for
Alice, the local phase of the photonic qubit has a Gaussian-like distribution on a circle, with standard deviation ∆φ
as observed in Ref. [31]. This motivates us to model the distribution as a von Mises distribution [101]. The von Mises
distribution reads
f(φ) =
eκ cos(φ−µ)
2piI0(κ)
. (A19)
Here µ is the measure of location, i.e., it corresponds to the center of the distribution, κ is a measure of concentration
and can be effectively seen as the inverse of the variance, and I0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind of
order 0. One can then show [101] that ∫ pi
−pi
dφf(φ)e±iφ =
I1(κ)
I0(κ)
e±iµ . (A20)
Since we are only interested in the noise arising from the lack of knowledge about the phase rather than the actual
value of this phase, without loss of generality we can assume µ = 0. Moreover, the experimental parameter that we
use here is effectively the standard deviation of the distribution ∆φ and therefore we can write κ = 1(∆φ)2 .
Hence, let us write the spin-photon entangled state that depends on the optical phase φ:∣∣ψ±(φ)〉 = sin(θ) |↓ 0〉 ± eiφ cos(θ) |↑ 1〉 . (A21)
Now, the lack of knowledge about this phase leads to a mixed state:
∫ pi
−pi
f(φ)
∣∣ψ±(φ)〉〈ψ±(φ)∣∣ dφ = sin2(θ) |↓ 0〉〈↓ 0|+ cos2(θ) |↑ 1〉〈↑ 1|
± sin(θ) cos(θ)
∫ pi
−pi
f(φ)(eiφ |↑ 1〉 〈↓ 0|+ e−iφ |↓ 0〉 〈↑ 1|)dφ .
(A22)
Let us now try to map this state onto a dephased state:
λ
∣∣ψ±(0)〉〈ψ±(0)∣∣+ (1− λ) ∣∣ψ∓(0)〉〈ψ∓(0)∣∣ = sin2(θ) |↓ 0〉〈↓ 0|+ cos2(θ) |↑ 1〉〈↑ 1|
± sin(θ) cos(θ)(2λ− 1)(|↑ 1〉 〈↓ 0|+ |↓ 0〉 〈↑ 1|) , (A23)
Hence, we observe that
2λ− 1 =
I1
(
1
(∆φ)2
)
I0
(
1
(∆φ)2
) . (A24)
→ λ =
I1
(
1
(∆φ)2
)
2I0
(
1
(∆φ)2
) + 1
2
. (A25)
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Appendix B: Noisy processes in NV-based quantum memories
In our setups we use 13C nuclear spins in diamond as long-lived memory qubits next to a Nitrogen Vacancy (NV)
electron spin taking the role of a communication qubit. In this appendix, we will detail our model of the noisy
processes in the NV.
The electron spin can be manipulated via microwave pulses and an optical pulse is used to create and send a photon
entangled with it. This operation is noisy and can be modeled as having a dephasing noise of parameter Fprep. This
means that, if the desired generated target state between the photon and the electron spin was |ψ+〉, we actually have
a mixture Fprep |ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ (1− Fprep)(I⊗Z) |ψ+〉〈ψ+| (I⊗Z).
Information can be stored via a swapping of the electron spin state to the long living nuclear 13C spin. Through
this swap operation we also free the communication qubit to be used for consecutive remote entanglement generation
attempts. Because of the interaction with its environment, a quantum state stored in a 13C spin quantum memory
undergoes an evolution that we model with a dephasing and a depolarizing channel with noise parameters λ1 =
(1 + e−an)/2 and λ2 = e−bn, respectively. The form of the parameters a and b in general depends on the scheme. For
the SiSQuaRe, SPADS and SPOTL schemes, there are two distinct effects that cause this decoherence: one induced
by the time it takes to generate entanglement between the middle node and Bob, and one induced by the always-on
hyperfine coupling between the electron spin and the carbon spin inside the middle NV node. This coupling becomes
an additional source of decoherence for the carbon spin during probabilistic attempts to generate remote entanglement
using the electron spin [38, 61]. We model the decoherence effect on the qubit stored in the carbon spin of the middle
node by a dephasing channel with parameter λ1,
Dλ1dephase(ρ) = λ1ρ+ (1− λ1)ZρZ , (B1)
and depolarizing channel with parameter λ2,
Dλ2depol(ρ) = λ2ρ+ (1− λ2)
I
D
, (B2)
where λ1 and λ2 quantify the noise. The parameters depend as follows on the number of attempts n,
λ1 = FT2 =
1 + e−an
2
, (B3)
λ2 = FT1 = e
−bn , (B4)
where a and b are given by
a = a0 + a1
(
Ls
nri
c
+ tprep
)
, (B5)
b = b0 + b1
(
Ls
nri
c
+ tprep
)
. (B6)
Here nri is the refractive index of the fiber, c is the speed of light in vacuum, tprep is the time it takes to prepare for
the emission of an entangled photon, and Ls is the distance the signal needs to travel before the repeater receives the
information about failure or success of the attempt. Let LB denote the distance between the memory repeater node
and Bob. Then for the SiSQuaRe and SPADS schemes Ls = 2LB , since in each attempt first the quantum signal
needs to travel to Bob, who then sends back to the middle node the classical information about success or failure.
For the SPOTL scheme Ls = LB , since in this case both the quantum and the classical signals need to travel only
half of the distance between the middle node and Bob since the signals are exchanged with the heralding station,
which is located halfway between the middle memory node and Bob. The parameters a0 and b0 quantify the noise
due to a single attempt at generating an entangled spin-photon, induced by stochastic electron spin reset operations,
quasi static noise, and microwave control infidelities. The parameters a1 and b1 quantify the noise during storage per
second.
Gates and measurements in the quantum memory are also imperfect. We model those imperfections via two
depolarizing channels. The first one acts on a single qubit with depolarizing parameter λ2 = Fm corresponding to
the measurement of the electron spin. The second one acts on two qubits with depolarizing parameter λ2 = Fg
corresponding to applying a two-qubit gate to both the electron spin and the 13C spin. This means that every time a
measurement is done on a e− qubit of a quantum state ρ, it is actually done on DFmdepol(ρ). Also a swapping operation
between the e− spin and the nuclear spin (done experimentally via two two-qubit gates; see main text) leads to an
error modeled by a depolarizing channel of parameter Fswap = F 2g . Following the same logic, a Bell state measurement
will cause the state to undergo an evolution given by a depolarizing channel. Specifically, following the decomposition
of the Bell measurement into elementary gates for the NV implementation as described in Sec. III, this evolution
will consist of a depolarizing channel with parameter F 2g acting on both of the measured qubits and the depolarizing
channel with parameter F 2m acting only on the electron spin qubit.
26
Appendix C: Expectation of the number of channel uses with a cut-off
In this appendix, we derive an analytical formula for the expectation value of the number of channel uses between
Alice and Bob needed to generate one bit of raw key for the SiSQuaRe, SPADS, and SPOTL schemes,
E[N ] =
1
pA · (1− (1− pB)n∗) +
1
pB
. (C1)
For these three schemes, we implement a cut-off which is used to prevent decoherence. Each time the number of channel
uses between the repeater node and Bob reaches the cut-off n∗, the entire protocol restarts from the beginning. Here,
we take a conservative view and define the number of channel uses N between Alice and Bob as the sum NA +NB ,
where NA (NB) corresponds to the number of channel uses between Alice (Bob) and the middle node. From the
linearity of the expectation value, we have that
E[NA +NB ] = E[NA] + E[NB ] . (C2)
We denote by pA and pB the probability of a successful attempt on Alice’s and Bob’s side respectively. Bob’s
number of channel uses follows a geometric distribution with parameter p = pB , so that E[NB ] = 1pB . Without the
cut-off, Alice’s number of channel uses would follow a geometric distribution with parameter p = pA. However, the
cut-off parameter adds additional channel uses on Alice side. Since the probability that Bob succeeds within n∗ trials
is psucc = 1 − (1 − pB)n∗ , we in fact have that Alice’s number of channel uses follows a geometric distribution with
parameter p′A = pApsucc. Hence, it is straightforward to see that
E[NA +NB ] =
1
p′A
+
1
pB
(C3)
=
1
pA (1− (1− pB)n∗) +
1
pB
. (C4)
Appendix D: SiSQuaRe scheme analysis
The analysis of the SiSQuare scheme has been performed in [17]. In this work we use the estimates of the yield and
QBER as derived in [17] with the following modifications:
(1) For the calculation of the yield, we now adopt a conservative perspective and calculate the number of channel
uses as E[NA + NB ], as derived in Appendix C, rather than E[max(NA, NB)]. Note that E[max(NA, NB)] ≤
E[NA +NB ] ≤ 2E[max(NA, NB)].
(2) The total depolarizing parameter for gates and measurements Fgm defined in Ref. [17] is now decomposed
into individual operations as described in Appendix B. That is, in this work depolarization due to imperfect
operations on the memories is expressed in terms of depolarizing parameter due to imperfect measurement, Fm,
and imperfect two-qubit gate, Fg. Since in the analysis of the SiSQuaRe scheme we only deal with Bell diagonal
states, the overall noise due to imperfect swap gate and the Bell measurement leads to Fgm = F 4g F 2m.
(3) In Ref. [17], we have assumed the duration of the detection time window to be fixed to 30 ns and assumed that
all the emitted photons will fall into that time window. Here, similarly as for other schemes, we perform a more
refined analysis in which we include the trade-off between the duration of the time window and the dark count
probability as described in Appendix A.
Appendix E: Single-photon scheme analysis
In this appendix, we provide a detailed analysis of the single-photon scheme between two remote NV-center nodes.
This section is structured as follows. First, we describe the creation of the spin-photon entangled state followed by
the action of the lossy channel on the photonic part of this state, including the noise due to the uncertainty in the
phase of the state induced by the fiber. Second, we apply the optical Bell measurement. Then we evaluate the effect
of dark counts, which introduce additional errors to the generated state. Finally, we calculate the yield of this scheme
and extract the QBER from the resulting state.
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Spin-photon entanglement and action of a lossy fiber on the photonic qubit
First, both Alice and Bob generate spin-photon entangled states, parameterized by θ. As we will later see, this
parameter allows for trading off the quality of the final entangled state of the two spins with the yield of the generation
process. The ideal spin-photon state would then be described as∣∣ψ+〉 = sin (θ) |↓〉 |0〉+ cos (θ) |↑〉 |1〉 . (E1)
The preparation of the spin-photon entangled state is not ideal. That is, the spin-photon entangled state is not
actually as described above, but rather of the form (see Appendix B)
ρ = Fprep
∣∣ψ+〉〈ψ+∣∣+ (1− Fprep)(I⊗Z) ∣∣ψ+〉〈ψ+∣∣ (I⊗Z) = Fprep ∣∣ψ+〉〈ψ+∣∣+ (1− Fprep) ∣∣ψ−〉〈ψ−∣∣ . (E2)
Here, ∣∣ψ−〉 = sin (θ) |↓〉 |0〉 − cos (θ) |↑〉 |1〉 . (E3)
For the next step, we need to consider two additional noise processes that affect the photonic qubits before the
optical Bell measurement is performed. The first one is the loss of the photonic qubit. This can happen at the
emission, while filtering the photons that are not of the required ZPL frequency, in the lossy fiber, in the imperfect
detectors, or due to the arrival outside of the time window in which detectors expect a click. All these losses can be
combined into a single loss parameter
η = ηtotal = pcepzpl
√
ηfp
′
det , (E4)
with ηf = exp
(
− LL0
)
, where L is the distance between the two remote NV-center nodes in the scheme (see Fig. 6
and Appendix A). Hence, a photon is successfully transmitted through the fiber and detected in the middle heralding
station with probability η. Now we note that the action of the pure-loss channel on the qubit encoded in the presence
or absence of a photon corresponds to the action of the amplitude-damping channel with the damping parameter
1− η [99].
The second process that effectively happens at the same time as loss is the dephasing noise arising from the optical
instability of the apparatus as described in Appendix A. We note that the amplitude-damping and dephasing channel
commute; hence, it does not matter in which order we apply the two noise processes corresponding to the loss of the
photonic qubit and unknown drifts of the phase of the photonic qubit in our model. Here, we first apply the dephasing
due to the lack of knowledge of the phase on Alice’s photon and then amplitude damping on both photons due to all
the loss processes.
Following the model in Appendix A, the lack of knowledge about the optical phase will effectively transform Alice’s
state to
ρA = (Fprepλ+ (1− Fprep)(1− λ))
∣∣ψ+〉〈ψ+∣∣+ ((1− Fprep)λ+ Fprep(1− λ)) ∣∣ψ−〉〈ψ−∣∣ . (E5)
where
λ =
I1
(
1
(∆φ)2
)
2I0
(
1
(∆φ)2
) + 1
2
. (E6)
Now we can apply all the transmission losses modeled as the amplitude-damping channel. The action of this channel
on the photonic part of the state ρ results in the state that we can describe as follows. First, let us introduce two new
states: ∣∣ψ±η 〉 = 1√
sin2(θ) + η cos2(θ)
(sin (θ) |↓〉 |0〉 ± √η cos (θ) |↑〉 |1〉) . (E7)
Then, after the losses and before the Bell measurement, the state of Alice can be written as
ρ′A =
(
sin2(θ) + η cos2(θ)
) (
(Fprepλ+ (1− Fprep)(1− λ))
∣∣ψ+η 〉〈ψ+η ∣∣+ ((1− Fprep)λ+ Fprep(1− λ)) ∣∣ψ−η 〉〈ψ−η ∣∣)
+ (1− η) cos2(θ) |↑〉〈↑| |0〉〈0| , (E8)
and for Bob
ρ′B =
(
sin2(θ) + η cos2(θ)
) (
Fprep
∣∣ψ+η 〉〈ψ+η ∣∣+ (1− Fprep) ∣∣ψ−η 〉〈ψ−η ∣∣)+ (1− η) cos2(θ) |↑〉〈↑| |0〉〈0| . (E9)
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States after the Bell measurement
Now we need to perform a Bell measurement on the photonic qubits within the states ρ′A and ρ
′
B . Here we
consider the scenario with non-photon-number-resolving detectors. Assuming for the moment the scenario without
dark counts, we have at most two photons in the system. Hence we can consider three possible outcomes of our
optical measurement: left detector clicked, right detector clicked, and none of the detectors clicked. The measurement
operators can be easily derived by noting that in our scenario without dark counts, each of the detectors can be
triggered either by one or two photons and no cross clicks between detectors are possible due to the photon-bunching
effect. Then we can apply the reverse of the beam splitter mode transformations to the projectors on the events
with one or two photons in each of the detectors to obtain these projectors in terms of the input modes. Finally, we
truncate the resulting projectors to the qubit space since in our scenario it is not possible for more than one photon
to be present in each of the input modes of the beam splitter. In this way we obtain the following measurement
operators:
A0 =
∣∣Ψ+〉〈Ψ+∣∣+ 1√
2
|11〉〈11| ,
A1 =
∣∣Ψ−〉〈Ψ−∣∣+ 1√
2
|11〉〈11| ,
A2 = |00〉〈00| .
(E10)
These outcomes occur with the following probabilities:
p0 = p1 = η cos
2(θ)
(
1− η
2
cos2(θ)
)
, (E11)
p2 = (1− η cos2(θ))2 . (E12)
The post-measurement state of the two spins for the outcome A0 is
ρ0 =
2 sin2(θ)
2− η cos2(θ)
(
a
∣∣Ψ+〉〈Ψ+∣∣+ b ∣∣Ψ−〉〈Ψ−∣∣)+ cos2(θ)(2− η)
2− η cos2(θ) |↑↑〉〈↑↑| . (E13)
Here, ∣∣Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|↓↑〉 ± |↑↓〉) , (E14)
a = λ(F 2prep + (1− Fprep)2) + 2Fprep(1− Fprep)(1− λ) , (E15)
b = (1− λ)(F 2prep + (1− Fprep)2) + 2Fprep(1− Fprep)λ . (E16)
For the outcome A1, the postmeasurement state of the spins is the same up to a local Z gate which Bob can apply
following the trigger of the A1 outcome. The postmeasurement state of the spins for the outcome A2, that is, when
none of the detector clicked, is
ρ2 =
1
[1− η cos2(θ)]2
(
sin4(θ) |↓↓〉〈↓↓|+ (1− η) cos2(θ) sin2(θ) (|↓↑〉〈↓↑|+ |↑↓〉〈↑↓|) + (1− η)2 cos4(θ) |↑↑〉〈↑↑|) . (E17)
This is a separable state and so events corresponding to outcome A2 (that is, no click in any of the detectors) will be
discarded as failure. However, dark counts on our detectors can make us draw wrong conclusions about which of the
three outcomes we actually obtained.
The effect of dark counts can be seen as follows
(1) We measured A2 (no actual detection) but one of the detectors had a dark count. This event will happen with
probability 2p2pd(1− pd) and will make us accept the state ρ2. Note that this is a classical state so application
of the Z correction by Bob does not affect this state at all.
(2) We measured A1 or A2 but we also got a dark count in the other detector. This event will happen with
probability (p0 +p1)pd. This will effectively lead us to rejection of the desired state ρ0. Hence, effectively ρ0 will
only be accepted if we measured A1 or A2 but the other detector did not have a dark count, which will happen
with probability (p0 + p1)(1− pd).
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The yield and QBER
Taking dark counts into account, we see that the yield of the single-photon scheme, which is just the probability of
registering a click in only one of the detectors, will be
Y = (p0 + p1)(1− pd) + 2p2pd(1− pd) = 2(1− pd)
[
η cos2(θ)
(
1− η
2
cos2(θ)
)
+ (1− η cos2(θ))2pd
]
. (E18)
The effective accepted state after a click in one of the detectors will then be
ρout =
1
Y
((p0 + p1)(1− pd)ρ0 + 2p2pd(1− pd)ρ2) . (E19)
Note that both Alice and Bob perform a measurement on their electron spins immediately after each of the spin-
photon entanglement generation events. This measurement causes an error modeled as a depolarizing channel of
parameter Fm on each qubit, which means that after a successful run of the single-photon protocol, the effective state
shared by Alice and Bob including the noise of their measurements will be given by
ρAB = F
2
mρout + (1− Fm)Fm
[
I2,A
2
⊗ trA[ρout] + trB [ρout]⊗ I2,B
2
]
+ (1− Fm)2 I4,AB
4
. (E20)
One can then extract the QBER for this state in all the three bases using the appropriate correlated/anti-correlated
projectors such that:
ez = Tr[(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)ρAB ] , (E21)
exy = Tr((|+−〉〈+−|+ |−+〉〈−+|)ρAB) = Tr((|0y1y〉〈0y1y|+ |1y0y〉〈1y0y|)ρAB) . (E22)
Here |+〉 and |−〉 denote the two eigenstates of X and |0y〉 and |1y〉 denote the two eigenstates of Y . We note that
for our model of the single-photon scheme the QBER in X and Y bases are the same and therefore we denote both
by a single symbol exy.
Appendix F: SPADS and SPOTL schemes analysis
In order to compute the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the Single-Photon with Additional Detection Setup
(SPADS) scheme and the Single-Photon Over Two Links (SPOTL) scheme, we derive step by step the quantum state
shared between Alice and Bob. The following results have been found using Mathematica. Finally, we also calculate
the yield of the SPADS and SPOTL schemes.
Generation of elementary links
Single-photon scheme on Alice side
The application of the single-photon scheme on Alice’s side leads Alice and the quantum repeater to share a state
given in Eq. (E19). This state can be rewritten as
ρA-QRe = A1
∣∣Ψ+〉〈Ψ+∣∣+B1 ∣∣Ψ−〉〈Ψ−∣∣+ C1 (|10〉〈10|+ |01〉〈01|) +D1 |11〉〈11|+ E1 |00〉〈00| , (F1)
with A1 = A(θA, YA), B1 = B(θA, YA), C1 = C(θA, YA), D1 = D(θA, YA) and E1 = E(θA, YA). Here, we have that
A(θ, Y ) =
1
Y
2 cos2(θ) sin2(θ)η(1− pd)
[
(F 2prep + (1− Fprep)2)λ+ 2Fprep(1− Fprep)(1− λ)
]
, (F2)
B(θ, Y ) =
1
Y
2 cos2(θ) sin2(θ)η(1− pd)
[
(F 2prep + (1− Fprep)2)(1− λ) + 2Fprep(1− Fprep)λ
]
, (F3)
C(θ, Y ) =
2
Y
cos2(θ) sin2(θ)pd(1− pd)(1− η) , (F4)
D(θ, Y ) =
1
Y
cos4(θ)
(
2(1− η)η(1− pd) + η2(1− pd) + 2(1− η)2pd(1− pd)
)
, (F5)
E(θ, Y ) =
2
Y
sin4(θ)pd(1− pd) . (F6)
In the above Y denotes the yield or the probability of success of the single-photon scheme and is given by Eq. (E18).
Subscript A indicates that in that expression for the yield and for each of the above defined coefficients we use θ = θA.
Moreover, we have made here the following change of notation with respect to the Appendix E, |↓〉 → |0〉 and |↑〉 → |1〉.
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SWAP gate in the middle node
In the next step, a SWAP gate is applied in the middle node to transfer the electron state to the nuclear spin of
the NV center. This causes a depolarizing noise of parameter Fswap = F 2g (see Appendix A). The resulting state can
then be written as
ρA-QRC = FswapρA-QRe + (1− Fswap) trQR[ρA-QRe ]⊗
I2,QR
2
. (F7)
The procedure on Bob’s side
We now use the electron spin of the quantum repeater to generate the second quantum state. Here, the procedures
for the SPADS and SPOTL schemes diverge.
In the procedure for the SPADS scheme, the quantum repeater generates a spin-photon entangled state where the
photonic qubit is encoded in the time-bin degree of freedom. Since the spin-photon entangled state is imperfect, the
electron and the photon share a state
ρQRe−B = Fprep
∣∣Ψ+〉〈Ψ+∣∣+ (1− Fprep) ∣∣Ψ−〉〈Ψ−∣∣ . (F8)
Here we use the following labeling for time-bin encoded early and late modes of the photon: |e〉 = |1〉 , |l〉 = |0〉. This
photon is then sent toward Bob’s detector. The lossy channel acts on such a time-bin encoded qubit as an erasure
channel and so the quantum spin-photon state of the successful events in which the photonic qubit successfully arrives
at the detector is unaffected by the lossy channel.
For the SPOTL scheme, the repeater’s electron spin and Bob’s quantum memory generate a second state of the
form given in Eq. (E19). We can rewrite this state as
ρQRe−B = A2
∣∣Ψ+〉〈Ψ+∣∣+B2 ∣∣Ψ−〉〈Ψ−∣∣+ C2 (|10〉〈10|+ |01〉〈01|) +D2 |11〉〈11|+ E2 |00〉〈00| , (F9)
with A2 = A(θB , YB), B2 = B(θB , YB), C2 = C(θB , YB), D2 = D(θB , YB), and E2 = E(θB , YB).
Decoherence in the quantum memories
Decoherence of the carbon spin in the middle node can be modeled identically for both the SPADS and SPOTL
scheme.
During the n < n∗ attempts to generate the state ρQRe-B, the carbon spin in the middle node holding half of the
state ρA-QRC will decohere. Using the decoherence model discussed in Appendix B, decoherence of the carbon spin
will thus give us
ρ′A-QRC = FT1 [FT2ρA-QRC + (1− FT2)(I2 ⊗ Z)ρA-QRC (I2 ⊗ Z)†] + (1− FT1) trQR[ρA-QRC ]⊗
I2,QR
2
. (F10)
For key generation, Alice (SPADS and SPOTL schemes) and Bob (SPOTL scheme) can actually measure their electron
spin(s) immediately after the generation of spin photon entanglement, preventing the effect of decoherence on these
qubit(s).
Noise due to measurements
Measurement of the qubits of Alice and Bob
In the SPADS scheme, Alice performs a measurement on her electron spin immediately after each of the spin-photon
entanglement generation events to prevent any decoherence with time of this qubit. This measurement causes an error
modeled as a depolarizing channel of parameter Fm. Bob, on the other hand, performs a measurement on a photonic
qubit that is encoded in the time-bin degree of freedom. His measurement utilizes the squashing map so that we
can model the noise arising from this measurement as a depolarizing channel with parameter αB as described in
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Appendix A. Hence, the total state just before the Bell measurement is given by
ρA−QR−B = FmαBρ′A-QRC ⊗ ρQRe−B + (1− Fm)αB
I2,A
2
⊗ trA[ρ′A-QRC ]⊗ ρQRe−B
+ (1− αB)Fmρ′A-QRC ⊗ trB [ρQRe−B ]⊗
I2,B
2
+ (1− Fm)(1− αB) trAB [ρ′A-QRC ⊗ ρQRe−B ]⊗
I4,AB
4
.
(F11)
For the SPOTL scheme, both Alice and Bob perform a measurement on their electron spins immediately after each
of the spin-photon entanglement generation events. This measurement causes an error modeled as a depolarizing
channel of parameter Fm on each qubit, which means that after both Alice and Bob succeeded in performing the
single-photon scheme with the repeater, the total, four-qubit state just before the Bell-measurement and including
the noise of the measurements of Alice and Bob will be given by
ρA−QR−B = F 2mρ
′
A-QRC ⊗ ρQRe−B + (1− Fm)Fm
[
I2,A
2
⊗ trA[ρ′A-QRC ]⊗ ρQRe−B + ρ′A-QRC ⊗ trB [ρQRe−B ]⊗
I2,B
2
]
+ (1− Fm)2 trAB [ρ′A-QRC ⊗ ρQRe−B ]⊗
I4,AB
4
. (F12)
Bell state measurement
Before the entanglement swapping, we have a total state ρA−QR−B . We now perform a Bell state measurement
on the two qubits in the middle node. The error coming from this measurement is modeled by concatenation of
depolarizing channels (see Appendix A), which means that the measurement is actually performed on
ρfin = F
2
g F
2
mρA−QR−B + F
2
g (1− F 2m) trQRe [ρA−QR−B ]⊗
I2,QRe
2
+ (1− F 2g ) trQR[ρA−QR−B ]⊗
I4,QR
4
. (F13)
While ρ′A-QRC is not Bell diagonal for the SPADS scheme, ρQRe−B is, and so we find that taking into account the
classical correction (which will be performed on the measured bit-value by Alice and Bob) the four cases corresponding
to different measurement outcomes are equivalent. This means that if we model the correction to be applied to the
quantum state rather than the classical bit, then the four post-measurement bipartite states shared between Alice
and Bob are exactly the same.
For the SPOTL scheme, both ρ′A-QRC and ρQRe−B are not Bell diagonal which means that the resulting state of
qubits of Alice and Bob after the Bell state measurement depends on the outcome of this Bell measurement and those
four corresponding states are not equivalent under local unitary corrections. In fact, the two states corresponding
to the Φ± outcomes and the two states corresponding to the Ψ± outcomes are pairwise equivalent under local Pauli
corrections. Hence, we will derive two different QBER corresponding to the following different resulting states shared
between Alice and Bob,
ρΦ,AB = (IA ⊗ UΦ±,B) TrQR
[
(I⊗ |Φ±〉〈Φ±| ⊗ I)ρfin(I⊗ |Φ±〉〈Φ±| ⊗ I)†
Tr(ρfin(I⊗ |Φ±〉〈Φ±| ⊗ I))
]
(I⊗ UΦ±,B)† , (F14)
ρΨ,AB = (IA ⊗ UΨ±,B) TrQR
[
(I⊗ |Ψ±〉〈Ψ±| ⊗ I)ρfin(I⊗ |Ψ±〉〈Ψ±| ⊗ I)†
Tr(ρfin(I⊗ |Ψ±〉〈Ψ±| ⊗ I))
]
(I⊗ UΨ±,B)† . (F15)
Here UΦ±,B and UΨ±,B denote the four Pauli corrections implemented by Bob after the corresponding outcome of the
Bell measurement. Note that for the SPADS scheme ρΦ,AB = ρΨ,AB .
The yield and QBER
a. Yield
For both the SPADS and SPOTL scheme, we calculate the yield as the inverse of the number of channel uses
required to generate one bit of raw key, Y = 1/E[N ], where E[N ] is given by Eq. (C1). For the SPOTL scheme in that
formula we use pA = YA (pB = YB), where YA (YB) denotes the yield of the single-photon scheme on Alice’s (Bob’s)
side given by Eq. (E18). For the SPADS scheme, pA takes the same form as for the SPOTL scheme (but is now
calculated for two thirds of the total distance between Alice and Bob rather than half), while pB is the probability of
registering a click in Bob’s optical detection setup as in the SiSQuaRe scheme.
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Extraction of the qubit error rates
By projecting these final corrected states onto the correct subspaces, we can obtain the qubit error rates ez and exy
(with our model we find that for both SPADS and SPOTL schemes the error rates in X and Y bases are the same).
The state shared between Alice and Bob after the Pauli correction will always be the same for the SPADS scheme.
Thus, there is only a single QBER ez and exy independently of the outcome of the Bell measurement. For the SPOTL
scheme that is not the case, there will be two sets of QBER corresponding to the states ρΦ,AB and ρΨ,AB :
ez,Φ = Tr[(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)ρΦ] , (F16)
ez,Ψ = Tr[(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)ρΨ] , (F17)
exy,Φ = Tr[(|+−〉〈+−|+ |−+〉〈−+|)ρΦ] = Tr((|0y1y〉〈0y1y|+ |1y0y〉〈1y0y|)ρΦ) , (F18)
exy,Ψ = Tr[(|+−〉〈+−|+ |−+〉〈−+|)ρΨ] = Tr[(|0y1y〉〈0y1y|+ |1y0y〉〈1y0y|)ρΨ] . (F19)
Again, for the SPADS scheme ez,Φ = ez,Ψ = ez and exy,Φ = exy,Ψ = exy.
Averaging the qubit error rates
We have now derived the qubit error rates as a function of the experimental parameters. For the SPOTL scheme,
we now average the QBER over the two outcomes to get the final average QBER,
〈ez〉 = 〈pΨez,Ψ + pΦez,Φ〉 , (F20)
〈exy〉 = 〈pΨexy,Ψ + pΦexy,Φ〉 , (F21)
where pΨ (pΦ) is the probability of measuring one of the |Ψ〉 (|Φ〉) states in the Bell measurement and 〈· · · 〉 is found
by averaging the expression over the number of Bob’s attempts n with the geometric distribution within the first
n∗ trials. For the SPADS scheme 〈ez〉 and 〈exy〉 can be averaged directly. The dependence on n arises from the
decoherence terms FT1 and FT2 . Indeed, those terms correspond to the decoherence in the middle node during the
attempts on Bob’s side. Denoting by pB the probability that in a single attempt Bob generates entanglement with
the quantum repeater using the single-photon scheme for the SPOTL scheme and using direct transmission of the
time-bin encoded qubit from the repeater to Bob for the SPADS scheme, we have that the exponentials in those
expressions can be averaged as follows [17]
〈e−cn〉 = pBe
−c
1− (1− pB)n∗
1− (1− p)n∗e−cn∗
1− (1− pB)e−c . (F22)
Appendix G: Secret-key fraction and advantage distillation
In this section, we review the formulas for the secret-key fraction for the QKD protocols used in our model as a
function of the QBER.
One-way BB84 protocol
For the fully asymmetric BB84 protocol with standard one-way post-processing, the secret-key fraction is given
by [80, 82]
r = 1− h(ex)− h(ez) , (G1)
where h(x) is the binary entropy function. Note that this formula is symmetric under the exchange of ex and ez; that
is, the secret-key fraction is the same independent of whether we extract the key in the Z or X basis. As we will see
later in this section, this is not the case for the six-state protocol with advantage distillation.
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Six-state protocol with advantage distillation
Now we shall examine the six-state protocol with advantage distillation of Ref. [81]. For the purpose of this section,
following the notation of Ref.[81], we shall denote the four Bell states as
|ψ(x, z)〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |0 + x〉+ (−1)z |1〉 |1 + x (mod 2)〉), (G2)
for x, z ∈ {0, 1}. We then write the Bell-diagonal state as
ρAB =
∑
x,z∈{0,1}
pxz |ψ(x, z)〉 〈ψ(x, z)| . (G3)
The considered advantage distillation protocol is described in Ref. [81]. It is shown there that if the key is extracted
in the Z basis, then the secret-key fraction for the fully asymmetric six-state protocol supplemented with this two-way
postprocessing technique is given by
rsix-state = max
{
1−H(PXZ) + PX¯(1)
2
h
(
p00p10 + p01p11
(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11)
)
,
PX¯(0)
2
[1−H(P ′XZ)]
}
, (G4)
where
PX¯(0) = (p00 + p01)
2 + (p10 + p11)
2 , (G5)
PX¯(1) = 2(p00 + p01)(p10 + p11) , (G6)
p′00 =
p200 + p
2
01
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
, (G7)
p′10 =
2p00p01
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
, (G8)
p′01 =
p210 + p
2
11
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
, (G9)
p′11 =
2p10p11
(p00 + p01)2 + (p10 + p11)2
, (G10)
PXZ (P ′XZ) is the probability distribution over the coefficients pxz (p
′
xz) and H(PXZ) (H(P ′XZ)) is the Shannon entropy
of this distribution.
Now let us have a look at how to link the Bell coefficients pxz with our QBER ez and exy (for all our schemes, the
estimated QBER in the X basis is the same as in the Y basis). In this section, we assume the target state that Alice
and Bob want to generate is |ψ(0, 0)〉. Note that in the analysis in Appendixes E and F it is the state |ψ(1, 0)〉 that is
a target, but of course the secret-key fraction analysis is independent of which Bell state is a target state as they are
all the same up to local Pauli rotations. Hence, the relation between the Bell-diagonal coefficients and the QBER is
p10 + p11 = ez , (G11)
p01 + p11 = exy , (G12)
p01 + p10 = exy , (G13)
p00 + p01 + p10 + p11 = 1 . (G14)
Therefore,
p00 = 1− ez
2
− exy ,
p01 = exy − ez
2
,
p10 = p11 =
ez
2
.
(G15)
And so,
PX¯(0) = 1− 2ez + 2e2z , (G16)
PX¯(1) = 2(1− ez)ez . (G17)
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It is important to note that for the above described advantage distillation, the amount of generated secret key
depends on the basis in which it is extracted, as has been shown in Ref. [102]. Let us now have a look at the amount
of key that can be extracted in the X and Y bases. As has been shown in Ref. [102], the secret-key fraction in these
cases is also given by Eq. (G4) but now the Bell coefficients depend on QBER in the following way:
p00 = 1− ez
2
− exy ,
p10 = exy − ez
2
,
p01 = p11 =
ez
2
.
(G18)
And so,
PX¯(0) = 1− 2exy + 2e2xy ,
PX¯(1) = 2(1− exy)exy .
(G19)
We note that we have assumed here that in the case of key extraction in Y basis, either Alice or Bob applies a local
bit flip in the Y basis to the shared state, as the target state |ψ(0, 0)〉 is anticorrelated in that basis.
In Ref. [102] it has been also observed that in the considered case of having the QBER in the X and Y bases
being equal, the six-state protocol with advantage distillation allows us to extract more key if it is extracted in the
basis with higher QBER. This observation determines the basis that we use for extracting key for the single-photon
and the SPOTL schemes that use fully asymmetric six-state protocol with advantage distillation. Specifically, for the
single-photon scheme we observe higher QBER in the Z basis, while for the SPOTL scheme the QBER is higher in
the X and Y bases. Therefore, these are the bases that we choose to use for extracting key for those schemes.
For the SiSQuaRe and SPADS schemes, the symmetric six-state protocol is used. Hence, for those schemes we
group the raw bits into three groups corresponding to three different key-extraction bases and we extract the key
separately for each of these bases. Finally, to obtain the final secret-key fraction, we note that for the symmetric
six-state protocol we also need to include sifting; that is, only one third of all the raw bits were obtained by Alice and
Bob measuring in the same basis (the raw bits for the protocol runs in which they measured in different bases are
discarded). Hence, if we denote by ri the secret-key fraction obtained from the group of raw bits in which both Alice
and Bob measured in the basis i, the final secret-key fraction for the six-state protocol for those schemes is given by
r =
1
3
(
1
3
rx +
1
3
ry +
1
3
rz
)
. (G20)
Clearly, in our case we have rx = ry = rxy.
One-way six-state protocol
In Fig. 7 we have also plotted the secret-key fraction for the one-way six-state protocol. For the fully asymmetric
protocol and the case in which the key is extracted in the Z basis, it is given by [80]
r = 1− ezh
(
1 + (ex − ey)/ez
2
)
− (1− ez)h
(
1− (ex + ey + ez)/2
1− ez
)
− h(ez) . (G21)
Although this formula does not appear to be symmetric under the permutation of ex, ey, ez, it is in fact invariant
under this permutation [103]. This means that for the symmetric one-way six-state protocol, in our case the final
secret-key fraction is given by the expression in Eq. (G21) multiplied by the sifting efficiency of one-third.
Appendix H: Runtime of the experiment
In this section, we will detail how to perform an experiment that will be able to establish that a setup can surpass
the capacity of a quantum channel modeling losses in a fiber (see Eq. (5)). This experiment can validate a setup to
qualify as a quantum repeater, without explicitly having to generate secret-key. We show then that, for the listed
parameters in the main text, the single-photon scheme can be certified to be a quantum repeater within approximately
12 hours.
35
The experiment is based on estimating the yield of the scheme and the individual QBER of the generated states.
More specifically, here we will calculate the probability that, assuming our model is accurate and each individual run
is independent and identically distributed, the observed estimates of the yield and the individual QBER are larger
and smaller, respectively, than some fixed threshold values. If, with these threshold values for the yield and QBER,
the calculated asymptotic secret-key rate still surpasses the capacity, we can claim a working quantum repeater. The
experiment consists of first performing n attempts at generating a state between Alice and Bob, from which the
yield can be estimated by calculating the ratio of the successful attempts and n. Then, the QBER in each basis is
estimated by Alice and Bob measuring in the same basis in each of the successful attempts.
Central to our calculation is the fact that, for n instances of a Bernoulli random variable with probability p, the
probability that the number of observed successes S(n) is smaller or equal than some value k is equal to
P (S(n) ≤ k) =
k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
pi (1− p)n−i . (H1)
Assuming the outcomes of our experiment are independent and identically distributed, the observed yield Y¯ satisfies
P
(
Y¯ ≤ (Y − tY )
)
= P
(
nY¯ ≤ n (Y − tY )
)
=
bn(Y−tY )c∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Y i (1− Y )n−i , (H2)
where Y −tY is the lower threshold. Let us make this more concrete with a specific calculation. For a distance of 17L0
the yield is equal to ≈ 5.6× 10−6. Setting the maximum deviation in the yield to Y¯ = Y − tY with tY = 2.0× 10−7
and the number of attempts to n = 5 × 109 (which corresponds to approximately a runtime of 12 hours assuming a
single attempt takes 8.5× 10−6 s, corresponding to tprep and a single-shot readout lasting 2.5× 10−6 s), we find that
P
(
Y¯ ≤ (Y − tY )
) ≤ 9.2 · 10−10 . (H3)
Similarly, for the individual errors {ek}k∈{x,y,z} in the three bases we have that
P (e¯k ≥ (ek + tk)) = P (m · e¯k ≥ m (ek + tk)) =
m∑
i=dm(ek+tk)e
(
m
i
)
(ek)
i
(1− ek)m−i . (H4)
Here we set m =
⌊
n
3 (Y − tY )
⌋
, which is an estimate for the number of raw bits that Alice and Bob obtain from
measurements in each of the three bases, for the total n attempts of the protocol. All the raw bits from those three
sets are then compared to estimate the QBER in each of the three bases. Note that we gather the same amount of
samples for each basis, even when an asymmetric protocol would be performed. Setting ti = t = 0.015, ∀i ∈ {x, y, z}
and, as before, n = 5× 109, we find, at a distance of 17L0 where ez ≈ 0.171 and ey = ex ≈ 0.141, that
P (e¯z ≥ (ez + t)) ≤ 9.0× 10−5 , (H5)
P (e¯y ≥ (ey + t)) = P (e¯x ≥ (ex + t)) ≤ 2.7× 10−5 . (H6)
Then, with probability at least
(1− P (e¯x ≥ (ex + t))) (1− P (e¯y ≥ (ey + t))) (1− P (e¯z ≥ (ez + t)))
(
1− P (Y¯ ≤ (Y − tY )))
≥ 1− 1.5× 10−4 , (H7)
none of the observed QBER and yield exceed their threshold conditions. The corresponding lowest secret-key rate for
these parameters (with a yield of Y − tY and QBER of ex + tx, ey + ty, ez + tz) is ≈ 1.97× 10−7, which we observe
is greater than the secret-key capacity by a factor ≈ 3.29 (see Eq.(5)) at a distance of 17L0, since the secret-key
capacity equals − log2
(
1− e−17) . 5.97× 10−8.
Thus, with high probability we can establish that the single-photon scheme achieves a secret-key rate significantly
greater than the corresponding secret-key capacity for a distance of 17L0 ≈ 9.2 km within approximately 12 hours.
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Appendix I: MDI QKD
We note here that the single-photon scheme for generating key is closely linked to the measurement-device-
independent (MDI) QKD protocol [45]. In particular, it is an entanglement-based version of a scheme in which
Alice and Bob prepare and send specific photonic qubit states to the heralding station in the middle, where the qubits
are encoded in the presence or absence of the photon. We note that in the ideal case of the single-photon scheme, the
spin-photon state is given in Eq. (E1). For the six-state protocol the spin part of this state is then measured in the X,
Y , or Z basis at random according to a fixed probability distribution (this probability distribution dictates whether
we use symmetric or asymmetric protocol). Considering the probabilities of the individual measurement outcomes,
this is equivalent to the scenario in which Alice and Bob choose one of the three set of states at random according to
the same probability distribution and prepare each of the two states from that set with the probability equal to the
corresponding measurement outcome probability. These sets do not form bases, as the two states within each set are
not orthogonal. We will therefore refer to these sets here as “pseudobases”. Depending on the chosen pseudobasis,
they prepare one of the six states encoding the bit value of “0” or “1” in that pseudobasis. These states and the
corresponding preparation probabilities are the following:
(1) pseudo-basis 1: {|0〉 , |1〉} with probabilities {sin2 θ, cos2 θ},
(2) pseudo-basis 2: {sin θ |0〉+ cos θ |1〉 , sin θ |0〉 − cos θ |1〉} with probabilities { 12 , 12},
(3) pseudo-basis 3: {sin θ |0〉+ i cos θ |1〉 , sin θ |0〉 − i cos θ |1〉} with probabilities { 12 , 12}.
These states are then sent toward the beam-splitter station. The station performs the standard photonic Bell-
state measurement and sends the outcome to both Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob discard all the runs for which the
beam-splitter station measured A2 (recall the measurement operators in Eq. (E10)). They then exchange the classical
information about their pseudo-basis choice and keep only the data for the runs in which they both used the same
basis. For those data they apply the following post-processing in order to obtain correlated raw bits
(1) Pseudo-basis 1: For both outcomes A0 and A1, Bob flips the value of his bit.
(2) Pseudo-basis 2: For the outcome A0, they do nothing; for the outcome A1, Bob flips the value of his bit.
(3) Pseudo-basis 3: For the outcome A0, they do nothing; for the outcome A1, Bob flips the value of his bit.
In this way, Alice and Bob have generated their strings of raw bits.
We note here that the direct preparation of the six states from the three pseudo-bases described above in the
photonic presence or absence degree of freedom is experimentally hard. This is related to the fact that linear optics
does not allow to easily perform the single qubit rotations necessary to prepare these states. The use of memory-
based NV centers offers a great advantage here, as in these schemes the rotations that allow us to obtain the required
amplitudes of the photonic states are performed on the electron spins rather than the photons themselves. There has
also been proposed an alternative scheme that also benefits from single-photon detection events in which Alice and
Bob send coherent pulses to the heralding station [42, 55].
